IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN RE DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC : Consol. C.A. No. CLASS V STOCKHOLDERS LITIGATION : 2018-0816-JTL

Chancery Court Chambers
Leonard L. Williams Justice Center
500 North King Street
Wilmington, Delaware
Friday, September 17, 2021
3:19 p.m.

BEFORE: HON. J. TRAVIS LASTER, Vice Chancellor

ORAL ARGUMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL AND RULINGS OF THE COURT - HELD VIA ZOOM

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
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THE COURT: Welcome, everyone. I know we have a lot of people on the line, so I'm hoping to focus on the folks who are going to present the motion to compel involving Mr. Green.

If I could start with Mr. Green's counsel and get introductions from them, we can then pivot over to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs can get underway.

MR. BARLOW: Your Honor, good afternoon. It's Mike Barlow from Abrams & Bayliss here today on behalf of defendant Bill Green. I am joined today by April Kirby of my office, as well as a team from Latham & Watkins, Michele Johnson, Kristin Murphy, and Ryan Walsh.

With the Court's permission,

Ms. Murphy will present the argument today. She's been admitted pro hac.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, and welcome to you.

And if I didn't say it before, welcome to everyone who has joined. The fact that I'm not going to take everyone's introduction doesn't mean I'm not very grateful to you-all for being here.

For the plaintiffs?

MR. WEINBERGER: Good afternoon, Your 1 2 Honor. Ned Weinberger on behalf of the plaintiff. 3 have colleagues on the line from my firm, as well as 4 co-counsel from Quinn Emanuel, Andrews & Springer and 5 Friedman, Oster & Tejtel and, finally, Robbins, 6 Geller, Rudman & Dowd. 7 THE COURT: Great. Well, welcome to 8 all of you as well. 9 Feel free to get underway. 10 MR. WEINBERGER: Okay. Ned Weinberger 11 again, for plaintiff, for the record. 12 We are here today on plaintiff's 13 motion to compel defendant William Green, who is one 14 of the two members of the special committee, to 15 produce emails that he is withholding on the basis of 16 attorney-client privilege. All of the emails that are 17 at issue are ones that Mr. Green either sent or 18 received in his capacity as a director of Dell 19 Technologies, but that he's sent or received using an 20 email account provided by and controlled by his former 21 employer, Accenture PLC. 22 The legal issue before the Court is 23 reasonable expectation of confidentiality. Mr. Green

contends that he had a reasonable expectation that

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Accenture would never monitor, review, or access any of his emails unless he were engaged in some type of wrongdoing. But as we explained in our papers, to the extent Mr. Green genuinely harbored that subjective expectation, it was objectively unfounded, given the policies that Accenture adopted and that Mr. Green was on notice of.

And these are policies adopted when Mr. Green was CEO of Accenture, when he was chairman of the board of Accenture, and they're policies that have remained in force following Mr. Green's retirement from the company. And despite my friends' suggestion in their papers, the policies have really never changed in any material respect. It's always been clear that users' privacy is limited. Accenture has always possessed the right to review, monitor, and access email, and that right has not been narrowed in any way, as my friends suggest.

And unless Your Honor has another preference, what I would like to do is perhaps walk you through a few of the policies, because I know there's a lot of sort of hop-scotching in my friends' papers, but I think if we sort of look at them chronologically, just a few of them, from the time

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when Mr. Green was CEO, when he was chairman, and the
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 2
    policy from the present day, I think you'll see that
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    the policies have remained very consistent over time.
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                    Your Honor, am I able to use screen
 5
    share, perhaps?
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                    THE COURT: If you're not currently,
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    then my intrepid clerk will facilitate that.
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                    MR. WEINBERGER: It looks like I am.
 9
    Thank you.
10
                    Okay. I'll sort of group these into
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    sets of policies. Your Honor received a number of
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    policies from Mr. Green's last year as CEO of
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    Accenture in 2010. In chronological order, it's
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    Exhibit C to Ms. Kirby's declaration, Exhibit D to
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    Ms. Kirby's declaration, and then Exhibits 9, 8, and 7
    to my declaration. And I'm only going to show you two
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17
    of the policies from 2010, which, again, is
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    Mr. Green's last year as CEO of Accenture.
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                    Now, what you should be seeing on my
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    screen is Kirby Exhibit C. This is the policy that
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    was adopted February 17, 2010. You can see the date
22
    there. And I'm just going to, really, show you two
23
    things in this policy. This is at page 4 of 13 of the
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policy, "Expectation of Privacy."

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And sort of skipping ahead to the second sentence of this Section 5.1, it states, "users should not have an expectation of absolute privacy in the materials that are created, sent, or received by them on Company systems." And it further states, "To the extent permitted by local laws and regulation, Company authorized personnel (such as Information Security team members, Computer Incident Response Team [] personnel, and technology support []) may examine all material stored on [the] Company['s] systems without prior notice."

And then the only other section I would point Your Honor to is Section 7.1. At the bottom of the same page, "Acceptable Use of Company E-mail." And I point this out because it states, consistent with all the other policies, personal use is no doubt permitted, but what Accenture's policies say is only limited personal use is acceptable.

The next policy I would point the Court to is Exhibit D to Ms. Kirby's declaration.

That should be showing on your screen. This was adopted May 14, 2010. If we scroll down to page 2 of 7, you'll see here again, there's a reference to personal use. "The Company allows limited personal

1 use of Company-provided Technology or Devices."

The last sentence, "Employees are encouraged to use a personal email account for personal communications." So, again, not a prohibition, but advised that if you want to keep your emails private, you use a personal email.

And then, scrolling down to page 4 of 7, the language has been removed about no absolute expectation of privacy. But in its place, in bold, paragraph 7, "As allowed under applicable laws and regulations, the Company may access, monitor, inspect, and/or remove any and all information contained on any and all Devices."

And that remains consistent. This is effectively the policy. There's a few more iterations of it. As I mentioned before, Exhibit 9 to my declaration, Exhibit 8, Exhibit 7, that remained in force throughout Mr. Green's tenure as CEO, which ended late in 2010.

The next policy I will show Your

Honor -- and by the way, these policies from his

tenure as CEO, they continued following his retirement
as CEO. This is sort of the next change, albeit

immaterial. And this is in Mr. Green's last 12 months

as chairman of the board of Accenture, before his full retirement from the company.

2.1

So what we're looking at here is the policy adopted March 1, 2012. You go down to page 2 of 10. Same as the last policy from 2010 we had looked at. Again, the reference to personal use, encouraging the users to use personal email account for personal communications.

And then, if we scroll down more, page 5 of 10, Accenture has added back in somewhat of another admonition. This is A.1, 7A.1, at the top of this page. "The Company needs to verify how Devices and Technology are used for a number of reasons ...."

The last sentence, "Users should therefore be aware that privacy will be limited as further explained below when using or connecting to Company Devices or Technology."

Further down, 7A.4, "Company[] Devices and Technology may be monitored for a number of reasons, including (but not limited to)[.]" So this is a nonexhaustive list. And the list includes things beyond simply, you know, wrongdoing.

For example, item 4 on the nonexhaustive list, "to ensure that the Company's

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systems are operating effectively and to perform
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 2
    disaster recovery ... locate [] retrieve data."
 3
                     "6. [] comply with law or ... court
 4
    order ...."
 5
                     "7. [] safeguard the environment
    . . . . "
 6
 7
                     "8.
                         [] quality control or training
    purposes."
 8
 9
                    And then, if we -- scrolling down to
10
    page 6 of 10, this is concerning the limited personal
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    use that, again, at all times has been permitted, but
12
    the admonition is that the personal use be limited.
13
    This explains acceptable personal use of devices or
14
    technology, and then there are some instructions.
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                     If users are using Accenture
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    technology for personal reasons, states at C.2, "Users
17
    who legitimately wish to protect the privacy of their
18
    communications or files when using the Company's
19
    Technology or Devices should mark such items clearly
20
    as 'private' or 'personal'. For example, by including
21
    'private' in the subject line of an email or in the
    name of a file."
22
23
                    Beneath that there's an admonition,
24
    notwithstanding about what we've told you about how to
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properly safeguard your personal emails, the company still has the right, subject to applicable laws, regulations, "to open [those] items that are marked as 'private' or 'personal' in some circumstances [again] including (but not limited to) ...."

So this is a nonexhaustive list of situations where items are marked personal or private. And, again, Mr. Green did not mark any emails "personal" or "private" or "privileged," give emails any specific notation. What the policy says is, nonetheless, if your emails -- even if you intend to keep them private, we still reserve the right to look at them.

Your Honor is from 2018. And I think, candidly, if I'm considering kind of what is the most relevant policy, in terms of Mr. Green's expectation, I would look to the policies from when he was CEO, from when he was chairman. According to his interrogatory responses, that is when he says he became aware of the policies that applied to his email. But nonetheless, I do want to point out to Your Honor just that the policies remained consistent continuing through the dates of Mr. Green's service on the special committee.

This last document is Exhibit 11 to my declaration, policies adopted March 9, 2018. Your Honor has two sets of 2018 policies in my declaration. Exhibit 11 and then -- Exhibit 10 to my declaration, also Exhibit B to Ms. Kirby's declaration, is also the second 2018 policy.

And here again, things are just reordered a little bit, but in substance still the same. Now personal use is addressed earlier. It's not in Section 7 anymore. It's been moved to Section 3. Again, limited personal use.

You move down to paragraph 2, there are instructions for how to keep your emails genuinely private. Mark them private, mark them personal.

Paragraph 4 says notwithstanding those efforts, the company still reserves the right to access a user's email.

And then we scroll down a bit further. This is Section 6.1. Again, an admonition. Privacy will be limited. And then, similar to the prior policies, the company's devices and technology may be monitored for a number of reasons, including but not limited to -- again, nonexhaustive list, and includes things, and even the list provided includes things

beyond just suspicion of wrongdoing by a user of the
Accenture emails.

themselves, Your Honor, the first factor, which focuses entirely on the policy, and as Your Honor notes in *Information Management Services*, courts have held the first factor weighs in favor of production where "employer advises employees that the employer monitors or reserves the right to monitor work email communications." Here, again, all of the policies are consistent, from the time when Mr. Green was CEO to when he was simply chairman following his retirement: users' privacy is limited. Accenture has the right to review, monitor, and access.

And that's confirmed at least implicitly by the affidavit from Paula Wlos, the IT executive at Accenture whose declaration was submitted by Mr. Green. She never disputes plaintiff's reading of the policies, which is the plain reading of the policies. Doesn't dispute that Accenture has at all times possessed the unfettered right to monitor, review, or access Mr. Green's emails.

As for the second Asia Global factor, the Court considers the degree to which Accenture has

acted in accordance with its policies. So essentially 1 2 two questions: Does Accenture enforce its policies, 3 and to the extent it doesn't, is Mr. Green aware of 4 it?

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- The answer to the first question, does 6 Accenture enforce its policies, the answer is yes. 7 And I go back again to the affidavit from the IT 8 executive from Accenture, which is very different from 9 the affidavit that the two defendants submitted in 10 Information Management Services.
  - There, the two defendants had submitted affidavits stating Information Management Services never at any time has actually monitored an employee's email. Here, Ms. Wlos never represents that. All she says is based on her personal knowledge -- and, again -- and notably, personal knowledge. She's not testifying on behalf of She states that she is not aware of Accenture. Accenture monitoring or accessing Mr. Green's emails since he left the company in 2013.
  - Third factor, ease of third-party access. This factor looks at what steps Mr. Green took to protect the privacy of his emails. The answer is, effectively, none. Didn't mark purportedly

privileged emails "privileged" or "private." Nor did

he take the more-meaningful steps to prevent access to

his email.

2.1

And I will note, there's -- you know, we point out in our papers that Mr. Green did have access to other emails. He had an AOL account. He's also CEO of another entity, GTY Technologies. He had other options at his disposal.

My friends say that even had he used a different email address, we would have challenged confidential -- we likely would have challenged confidentiality of that. I would point out, Your Honor, there were five outside directors on Dell's board during the relevant time period, including Ellen Kullman, former CEO of DuPont, director of many companies. She uses a Gmail address. So it is not -- and just from experience and what we see case to case to case, this is very common, for outside directors not to be using their corporate third-party email address, but rather, a Gmail, something along those lines.

The fourth *Asia Global* factor, Your Honor, looks at whether Mr. Green was aware of Accenture's policy. If the employee had actual or

constructive knowledge of the policy, the factor favors production. Mr. Green was aware of Accenture's policy. He admits it. He suggests he had a somewhat different understanding of the policy. I don't think that that actually complies, given that he was the senior-most executive of the company, as CEO and then, ultimately, chairman of the board. So he should be charged, at a minimum, with constructive knowledge of what Accenture's policies are and were.

And so, Your Honor, I will stop there and ask if the Court has any questions. And if Your Honor does not, I will cede the floor to Ms. Murphy.

THE COURT: Help me think through this. What is the distinction between Gmail, Google's ability to access Gmail, or AOL's ability -- if they're even a company anymore. They're probably a URL that's owned by somebody else -- to access an AOL account and Accenture's ability to access Green's account?

MR. WEINBERGER: So my understanding is Gmail and AOL, as a professional service provide, they do not possess the unfettered right to simply access and review customer or client emails. If we serve a subpoena on Gmail asking for, for example,

1 Ms. Coleman's Gmail, they would not have the ability
2 to simply hand over her emails without client consent.

And just to give you an analogy, Your Honor, in this case, we subpoenaed phone records of certain -- certain defendants. Subpoenaed phone records from professional service providers, I believe AT&T. AT&T would not simply produce those emails to us -- or not emails to us, but those phone records, text records, et cetera, without customer or client consent.

Here, I think if -- as a matter of fact, if we go back to the specific Accenture policies, Accenture, in fact, warns users of the email that -- to comply with the court order or law or subpoena, your emails may be accessed by the company.

So I view, again, the corporate policy or third-party corporate email with a clear policy stating that the employer can review the policies very different from the understanding and expectations that one has when using the email of a professional service provider.

THE COURT: All right. And say more about why this is a good policy to apply, in terms of causing the use of an employer-sponsored email account

- 1 under policies like this one to effectuate a waiver.
- 2 | Help me think, from the big picture, why that is
- 3 beneficial.
- 4 MR. WEINBERGER: I certainly
- 5 understand the sort of initial policy premise of
- 6 | privilege, and that we do absolutely want to encourage
- 7 | clients to freely consult with counsel. But there are
- 8 limitations on that. And this is not a circumstance
- 9 that applies to every single director of every single
- 10 | corporate board.
- 11 As I mentioned to Your Honor, Dell, in
- 12 2018, had five outside directors, individuals who work
- 13 | for Silver Lake. Mr. Dorman used an email account
- 14 from a small family office that he and his son ran.
- 15 | So to the extent -- the policy question is no doubt a
- 16 little bit difficult, but I guess what I would say is
- 17 | this is not, you know, a scenario where I would say
- 18 | we're opening the floodgates, in any respect, to broad
- 19 | waivers of privilege for outside directors.
- I think the ultimate effect is it ends
- 21 | up remaining consistent with the policy of
- 22 | attorney-client privilege that, in most cases, there
- 23 | will be no waiver and that, yes, certainly, if
- 24 directors are using Gmail or other accounts, or even

employer emails that are not subject to policies that state that the employer can, you know, for any reason review the email, that it will not in that instance result in a waiver.

THE COURT: And what would the policy have to say, in your view, to be sufficient?

MR. WEINBERGER: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I'm not -- when you say -- what would the policy have to be --

advising some issuer, and we think, for whatever reason, that it's good to have our officers serve on boards of other companies, but we also don't want routine waivers of privilege when they're serving on boards of other companies. So we want to adopt a policy that somehow finesses this issue. I mean, the harder question is how would one reserve the right to monitor for some stuff and yet protect against waiver.

But let's just start with the idea of what would I have to have in that policy so that there wouldn't be the waiver risk? Would my policy have to say, effectively, the company will not monitor or access employee email accounts that use company technology without employee consent, or is there

something short of that that I could implement?

MR. WEINBERGER: You could absolutely implement something short of that. I think the scenario Your Honor posits is probably one end of the spectrum. Similar to the Accenture policies, we could have instructions for how a user would mark or designate a particular email, and the policy could state that the employer/issuer, as Your Honor said, would not access an email that is marked "privileged" or that is marked "outside board use."

We could also have a policy where separate email accounts are issued in the instance where an executive does serve as an outside director of another company. So there are things, just as a practical matter, like that — issuing a different email account or having a modified policy — that would absolute prevent the waiver scenario that we submit has occurred here.

And when you have this monitoring idea out there, what happens in just a normal derivative action -- let's assume, you know, an outside holder of some relatively small percentage -- you know, let's be generous and say a 2 percent holder -- brings a derivative action. All the directors of the company

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have been issued company email accounts. Would you
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    think that, in that setting, if the company had a "we
 3
    will monitor" or "we reserve the right to monitor"
 4
    policy, that you could effectively get the
 5
    attorney-client privileged communications that were
 6
    sent over the company email?
 7
                    MR. WEINBERGER: So in your scenario,
    the company issues emails for the outside directors?
 8
 9
                    THE COURT: Yeah. So imagine I'm
10
    Dell, just to use a randomly selected entity.
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                    MR. WEINBERGER:
                                      Sure.
12
                    THE COURT: And I decide that I don't
13
    want to deal with future issues involving people using
14
    their own email accounts, like an Accenture account or
15
    some other account. So I'm now going to give all my
    directors Dell accounts. But I have a monitor policy
16
17
    in place.
18
                    What happens in a derivative action?
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    So in a derivative action, you're nominally suing on
20
    behalf of the company. Traditionally, you'd have to
21
    go through Garner to get that. I'm wondering, would
22
    those directors have a reasonable expectation of
23
    privacy in that setting? And -- go ahead.
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MR. WEINBERGER: Well, again, I think

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it's probably a scenario that would be addressed
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    through the policy governing those emails. And so I
 3
    could certainly see, as an outside director, having
 4
    some discomfort if the policy said, okay, this is
    being issued to you as a director, but we still
 5
 6
    reserve the unfettered access -- unfettered ability
 7
    and right to review, access, and monitor that email.
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    I could see that giving you perhaps a little bit of
 9
    heartburn, as an outside director. So I think it's
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    something that, in practice, could be addressed, would
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    be addressed by an issuer.
12
                    In the scenario that you've raised of
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    the derivative action, I certainly -- I think I'd have
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    to think through that scenario a little bit more,
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    including wondering at what point does the company
16
    truly become adverse to that director. I believe the
17
    law suggests that the company is not necessarily
18
    adverse to insiders simply because a stockholder -- or
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    at all times simply because a stockholder has
    initiated a case nominally in the name of the company.
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21
                    THE COURT: All right. Anything else
22
    you want to tell me?
23
                    MR. WEINBERGER:
                                     Nothing else, Your
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    Honor, for right now, at least.
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1 THE COURT: Okay.

Ms. Murphy.

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MS. MURPHY: Thank you, Your Honor.

So I want to address a few things that  $\mbox{my friend Mr.}$  Weinberger said, and I'll get there in a  $\mbox{minute.}$ 

But, I don't know, I think important context here, right, is, as he said, Mr. Green retired from Accenture in 2013. He was given use of his email from then on, in addition to office space and an administrative assistant, really, as a courtesy to him so that he could continue using their resources in recognition of the 35 years of service he put in with that company.

He has used that Accenture.com email address to correspond about Dell business, to correspond about EMC business before that, when he was a director on the EMC board and then came to join the Dell board. He uses it on numerous other -- he's on six other boards. He's been on many others in the last decade or so. This is the email address he uses for that.

And he had no doubts about the confidentiality of his emails that were sent using

this email account. You know, as Your Honor knows, there are nearly a thousand emails that are the subject of this motion, because he sent virtually every email about the Class B transaction with this email address.

2.1

As we submitted, you know, Dell -- a representative of Dell testified that they have no concerns. They never expressed concerns to him. They do not have concerns that this email was not safe and secure. Notwithstanding that, apparently, other board members did use Gmail accounts. So there's really no question here that Mr. Green subjectively intended for his attorney communications about the Class B transaction to be private and that he subjectively believed that they were private.

And so the question for you, the really narrow question, based on all the facts here, is, you know, was Mr. Green, as the former CEO and chairman of Accenture -- which, by the way, specializes in IT services -- objectively unreasonable in his belief that these emails would remain confidential.

You know, Your Honor wrote, in the Information Management decision, that in light of the

variety of work environments, whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy has to be decided on a case-by-case basis. And in this case, based on the nature of Mr. Green's relationship with Accenture during this period, based on the Accenture email policies and their actual practices, and based on the fact that Mr. Green is an outside director of Dell, he never had a Dell email address, the law strongly favors maintaining privilege over these 900 emails.

And a little bit more on Information
Management, Your Honor. I want to talk a little bit
about the facts there, because I think, you know,
understanding the facts and the guidance that Your
Honor gave in that case really underscores a lot of
the reasons why production would not be appropriate
here. Information Management was, of course, a
derivative case. You just brought up the derivative
hypothetical with Mr. Weinberger, and I think that
really illustrates the point, right?

So there are executives who are adverse to the company, and while this litigation is going on, they are using company email addresses to correspond with their personal attorneys about their defense in this litigation against the company. And

Your Honor cautioned that the corporation and its employees should be on different and stronger ground when those outside the corporation seek to compel production of otherwise privileged documents that employees have sent using work email.

A stockholder of Dell is seeking documents from a former employee of Accenture.

Mr. Green is not adverse to Accenture. Dell is not adverse to Accenture. And, you know, while you pointed out in that opinion, and plaintiffs pointed out in their briefs, certainly there are other cases where courts have found no expectation of privacy for other reasons in suits by outsiders, I think this is a really important framing and important factor that should go into the overall analysis of whether he was reasonable in believing that he had an expectation of privacy here.

So I will walk through the Asia Global factors. Factor one focuses on the text of the policy itself. I'm not sure I need to say a lot here, because Mr. Weinberger graciously walked us through, you know, each of those policies. I'm not sure it makes a material difference here, but I think one important thing is it is not surprising to me that the

plaintiffs think that the 2010 policies, while

Mr. Green was the CEO of Accenture, are the most

important policies, because they obviously had that

language that an employee should have no expectation

of privacy. They did not really provide for personal

use.

- We obviously, you know, would say that the relevant policy, or the most relevant policy here, is the one that was in place in 2018, during which the vast majority of these emails in question were sent, right? The Class B transaction was largely negotiated -- entirely negotiated in 2018. So that's really the time period we're talking about.
- And that 2018 policy looks a lot like it did -- you know, really, dating back to about 2012, when Mr. Green had transitioned into the chairman role of the board and no longer was the CEO of the company. And since that time, every iteration of the policy has expressly allowed for personal use and has set forth limited specific circumstances under which Accenture reserves the right to monitor personal emails.
- And, you know, as a reminder here, all of Mr. Green's emails from 2013 on were personal. He no longer worked for Accenture. And I think that's a

really important point to keep coming back to, because
this -- the company had no legitimate interest in
monitoring his emails.

And, obviously, you know, even setting aside the policy, they have said, whether under the policy or not, they did not monitor his emails.

THE COURT: I guess I would push back on you on that a little bit, because assume that you had some Bizarro World where Green went rogue and was engaging in some type of illicit activity, or something like that, and the company had reason to believe that.

I personally don't think for a second that Accenture would have hesitated, under those circumstances, to monitor his emails or to go in and look at them or to access them. And it would have relied on this policy to do so, notwithstanding that he wasn't an employee. Because he would have been out there -- again, in my extreme hypothetical -- sending emails with an Accenture URL on them in damaging ways, or ways that could create exposure for the company.

And that's part of the reason why I'm not sure how much the former employee issue gets you. I like the idea that it shifts. It shows that all of

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his business, or most of his business, all of his
business, was going to be personal. And so there was
some implicit acknowledgment from Accenture that that
was the case.
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But I just can't believe that they were going to be hands-off if they got some reason -- and we can all credit that it's my hypothetical -- but if you had someone in this situation who was engaging in illicit behavior, that they wouldn't have gone in.

Now, are you willing to concede that

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MS. MURPHY: Of course. Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. MURPHY: Of course. And the

policy specifically sets that out. So he -- you know,

16 | the policy says if it's related to -- so talking about

17 personal emails. If it's related to Accenture

18 business, if the company suspects that you're breaking

a law or otherwise violating company policy, if it's

20 related to company litigation or an internal

21 investigation, or if the company inadvertently

22 accesses your emails, you know, these are all

23 possibilities.

And so the question is, going back to

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your hypothetical, was it reasonable for him to think
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    that he had privacy here. And the answer is yes,
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    because he was not doing that sort of -- engaging in
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    that sort of activity, right?
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                    So, yes, that was a possibility.
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    he did not reasonably expect that that was going to be
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    the basis for monitoring here, because he wasn't
    engaged in that kind of conduct.
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                    Your Honor, I think you're muted.
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                    THE COURT: Sorry about that.
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    you so much.
                 I appreciate it.
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                    I have been looking at Exhibit E,
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    which is the March 2012 policy. Just for those
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    purposes, if you go to page 6 on that, which talks
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    about the types of things that you've been saying when
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    the company will still look, is a gating item for that
    type of hands-off behavior that the employer has to
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    have marked clearly the email as private or personal?
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                    MS. MURPHY: That's not our -- sorry.
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                    THE COURT: Go ahead. No.
                                                 I was just
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    trying to reiterate my question more clearly, but you
22
    probably understand what I'm asking.
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                    MS. MURPHY: I think I understand the
24
    question, and I think the answer is if it is -- if the
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emails are understood to be personal, then this is the bucket that they fall under. I don't think it is -you know, the company encourages that marking. We think that encouragement is sort of futile when it comes to Mr. Green, who is actually no longer doing Accenture business.

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And, you know, I understand your point about the former employee, but that's where I think it matters, is the assumption that all of his emails are personal to start with.

THE COURT: So the fact that he didn't mark his emails personal, you don't view that as a problem because there was this understanding that, generally, what he was doing was personal? He was retired?

MS. MURPHY: That's right. There were no Accenture business-related emails going on at that time. So the assumption is that all of them were personal.

And by the way, you know, it wasn't just Dell boards. It's other boards too. So it would have been a lot of emails. And I'm not sure I understood Your Honor -- or Mr. Weinberger suggested that he's also the CEO of GTY, and so he had that

email to use. I'm not really sure why that would have been different or better, particularly when he was the actual CEO there.

THE COURT: I guess the idea is just because everyone, effectively, always has the option of getting a Gmail account, is it, therefore, more fair to look at someone who doesn't do that and say, "Hey, look, you chose to use the monitored account. Don't come crying to me now."

So I suspect Mr. Weinberger was thinking something along that line; like, who knows what the policy was at GTY, but it might have been better. Or who knows what it was at AOL. It certainly wasn't better. So why shouldn't we basically say to him, "You made a choice. You're stuck."

MS. MURPHY: Yeah. And to that I would say I think he reasonably believed that his Accenture.com email, at that point, was maybe superior to Gmail in a lot of ways. This is a technology company. He gets access to an administrative assistant who can help him, you know, stay organized. And so -- and he gets to keep contacts from -- that is what he used for 35 years. Or maybe there wasn't

email for that whole time, but that's what he used for that entire period. And so it just made sense, now that he's going to go onto all these public company boards and be in contact with many of the same people, that he would use that, rather than starting this completely new Gmail account; which, you know, I have not seen any evidence from the plaintiffs about why that is, in fact, more secure. He raised the hypothetical and talked about the AT&T subpoena. But I don't think any of that really goes to the heart of this, which is was the Accenture email reasonably private.

So factor two, of course, is actual monitoring. I think we've talked about that. I think Mr. Weinberger sort of unfairly characterized the Accenture declaration and suggested that she agreed that their access was unfettered. I don't think that's an accurate characterization of the policy, and it's certainly not what she said in her declaration. I think the most important takeaway from her declaration is they followed the policy and they did not monitor his emails during the time period, other than to access them to help us respond to discovery in this litigation.

Factor three, I think, you know, as

Your Honor noted in Information Management, this is a

really similar analysis to the first two, in that of

course we can't dispute that Accenture had the

technical ability to access Mr. Green's account during

this period, but for the reasons that we all -- that

we just discussed, the requirement or the

encouragement to label these emails private or

confidential in order to avoid access by Accenture

just doesn't make any sense for him in this situation,

when he was not actually doing Accenture business

during this period.

2.1

And then factor four, was Mr. Green aware of Accenture's email policies. Yes, he was generally aware of the policies. And his belief, as Mr. Weinberger explained, was that because he was not engaged in wrongdoing or company litigation or any other, you know, of those identified circumstances, that Accenture was not -- had no reason to, and was not going to, monitor his emails.

He had every reason to expect that these were going to stay confidential. And as I said, Dell had the same expectation. They had no concerns with him having used this email address for five or

six years now on their board.

back to the ultimate question, Your Honor, which is based on all these facts, based on his situation, based on the text of these policies — which clearly allow for some personal use and, really, delineates specific circumstances where access is appropriate — you know, was Mr. Green really unreasonable in his belief that these emails were going to stay confidential. And we think the answer to that is, obviously, no.

So if you have questions, I'm happy to answer them.

THE COURT: I appreciate it.

I think the biggest question I would have is what do you think are the main distinguishing factors between this case and the Neumann request for emails in WeWork?

MS. MURPHY: Sure. A lot of differences, so I'm glad you asked. First of all, the two employees claiming privilege in that case obviously were both actively employed by both Sprint and Softbank. They both had Sprint and Softbank email addresses, but they chose to use the Sprint email

address to talk about the confidential Softbank business.

1.5

So I think that's point number one, right? Mr. Green is not actively employed by either of these companies. He is an outside director at Dell. He has no Dell email address. So I think that's point one.

And by the way, a related point on that is, going back to the what email address should he use. You know, even if Dell had issued an email address in this case, Bill Green was a special committee member. He was adverse to Dell for a great portion of this. So, you know, what email address, really, would he have used then?

Turning to --

THE COURT: The glib answer is outside directors get email addresses. And so you'd have BillGreen\_outsidedirector@Gmail, and you'd have one of those for each of your companies.

So I guess why isn't that just the easy and simple policy solution and, in fact, better board hygiene, and a rationale where a monitoring policy effectively leads to a lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy, in fact, has this beneficial

policy consequence of creating an incentive to engage in a better hygiene practice by separating out your emails?

MS. MURPHY: I think that's a lot to ask of public company board members, who often serve on five or more boards, to have a different email address for every single company they sit on.

I also think we're making kind of a big assumption, and we don't have any evidence, that Gmail is, in fact, a more appropriate, more secure — at least more than Accenture, right? I mean, I'm here to talk about Mr. Green, but I think that would have really dangerous policy consequences if we were to suggest that an individual Gmail address for every single board is better than what Mr. Green did here.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I interrupted you. You were explaining to me that one of the key distinctions, as you view it, with WeWork is the degree to which people involved in the email were adverse. I interrupted you, so why don't you carry on.

MS. MURPHY: Sure. So I guess the next part I was going to cover was the Sprint policy, which I think had a lot more teeth, was a lot more

aggressive than Accenture's. They explicitly said -and I say "explicitly" because I'm talking about the
relevant policy at the time -- said that employees
should have no expectation of privacy and that they
reserved the right to review workplace communications
at any time.

And Chancellor Bouchard criticized the parties for not submitting evidence about actual monitoring, which I think we've done here, and we've showed you that the policy is not that broad, that that "no expectation of privacy" language was removed in 2010 and never put back into the policy.

And then, finally, I think another really important factor there was that the witnesses -- you know, there was actually information in the record before Chancellor Bouchard that the witnesses had expressed concern about the confidentiality of their Softbank information on the Sprint emails and suggested moving on to another channel.

So that, again, is very different.

Mr. Green never had those concerns, still never had those concerns. So I think we're in a different world than WeWork.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

2 Mr. Weinberger.

MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you, Your

4 Honor. Just very briefly.

Ms. Murphy started her presentation sort of highlighting that, you know, Mr. Green has retired from Accenture, that we need to bear that in mind. And I think we do need to bear that in mind. It seems pretty clear that he made, effectively, a tradeoff when he retired, as Ms. Murphy mentioned, by getting continued use of his email and system and office. He got to keep his contacts. He got to basically keep status quo.

And what he exchanged for that was privacy and control. His assistant is an employee of Accenture. His email account is controlled by Accenture. His personal office is controlled by Accenture.

In terms of -- and, second, the notion that Accenture understood at all times that his email was going to be used for other corporate boards, I'm not sure that that's really been established in the record at all. When we were investigating the claims of privilege, we served Mr. Green with

- 1 | interrogatories. It's Exhibit 12 to my declaration.
- 2 And we asked, why did you continue using your
- 3 | Accenture email address when you left the company?
- 4 | And his response was "Seamless transition of
- 5 | leadership, " which, to me, is very different than "I
- 6 was going to be a professional board member and I
- 7 | wanted to use my Accenture email address for those
- 8 boards."
- 9 So I know he says that in the
- 10 | affidavit that he's submitted in connection with the
- 11 opposition, but that was not his response, his sworn
- 12 response to the interrogatories we served months
- 13 | earlier, when I think he didn't understand what was
- 14 | actually happening in terms of potential challenge.
- In terms of, I guess, most relevant
- 16 | policy, I'd just underscore, again, it doesn't matter
- 17 | which policy the Court looks at. Ms. Murphy said
- 18 | 2018's most relevant. Well, 2018 has the admonition
- 19 | that I showed Your Honor, bottom of page 11 of 15.
- 20 Be aware that privacy will be limited. That was the
- 21 warning.
- In terms of, you know, whether it was
- 23 unreasonable to ask him to mark certain emails, I
- 24 | don't think there's anything unreasonable about a

director marking an attorney-client privileged email 1 2 or a purportedly attorney-client privileged email 3 "privileged," "attorney-client privilege," "private." 4 And I think something else to bear in mind, too, just in terms of monitoring and review. 5 6 I'm not sure that it's always just limited or focused 7 user by user. Companies have all sorts of reasons to, 8 across the board, review users' emails -- for 9 compliance with the law, downloading of software that 10 compromises a system's integrity. And so, you know, 11 when the IT personnel, or whomever, is looking at 12 these emails, they're not saying, "Oh, that's William 13 We understand that he serves on outside 14 boards." So I'm not sure it's so clear-cut. 15 The last point, or perhaps 16 second-to-last point I would make, Your Honor had 17 asked about the policy of issuing separate email 18 accounts to outside directors, and Ms. Murphy said 19 that that's a lot to ask of corporate directors, to 20 use, if they serve on three separate boards, three 21 separate emails. 22 I don't think it is a lot to ask of a 23 director. Even leaving aside good corporate hygiene, 24 it's not a lot to ask of a corporate director who

meets, what, ten or fewer times a year and is paid six or seven figures serving on a corporate board, to have one isolated email account for their work on that board. I don't think that is too much to ask at all.

And that's not what we're asking for, as a matter of fact. Again, Mr. Green had other alternatives, just as the other outside directors of the company had various alternatives.

And then, just finally, Your Honor had

asked distinctions in WeWork. I don't think there's a whole lot of distinction there. You know, I think Mr. Neumann is, arguably, more of an outsider than Steamfitters is, who was owed a duty by Mr. Green. The certified class here was owed a duty by Mr. Green. So I don't know that I really -- you know, I understand sort of the outside employer versus employee contact, but I would not really consider the plaintiff here to be an outsider. Certainly, again, I would submit less of an outsider than Mr. Neumann was in WeWork.

And, sure, in WeWork, there were two emails. Here, Mr. Green had at least -- at least two emails at his disposal, if not three.

So with that, again, I'll stop. If

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Your Honor has any questions, happy to answer them.
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                    THE COURT: No. I appreciate it.
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    It's all very helpful.
                    It's 4:15 now. Let's take ten
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    minutes, and then we'll come back on at 4:25.
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              (Recess taken, 4:15 to 4:25 p.m.)
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                    THE COURT: All right. Welcome back,
               Thank you for your presentations and for
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    everyone.
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    returning to the Zoom promptly. I appreciate it.
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                    I'm going to go ahead and give you my
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    ruling now. As I usually do, I'll give you the bottom
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    line up front. I'm going to deny the motion, based on
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    the particulars of the Accenture policy as it applies
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    to Mr. Green's use, which I think was understood to be
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    personal, given his relationship with the company at
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    the time. Given the parameters of Accenture's policy
17
    when viewed against those facts, Mr. Green's
    expectation of confidentiality in his email account
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    was objectively reasonable.
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                    I'm now going to spell that out a
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    little bit more. William Green is a director of Dell
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    Technologies and the former CEO of Accenture LLP.
23
    While employed with Accenture, Green had a corporate
24
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email account from Accenture associated with the URL

Accenture.com. Upon retiring from Accenture, Green was provided with office space, a personal assistant, and other support services, including continued access to an Accenture.com email account.

Since his retirement, Green has, in fact, continued to use his Accenture.com email account. Because Green was retired and no longer working for Accenture, it was understood that Green necessarily was using that account for matters unrelated to the business of Accenture.

While serving as a director of Dell on a special committee of the board of directors of Dell, Green used his Accenture corporate email account to communicate with counsel for the special committee. The plaintiffs have moved to compel production of those emails, approximately 925 in number. They argue that Green did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using his Accenture.com email account and hence cannot assert privilege for those emails.

Delaware Rule of Evidence 502(b)

permits a client to assert privilege to protect

"confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services ...." So one requisite is the existence of

"confidential communications."

The burden of proving that the requirements of the privilege are met, including the element of confidentiality, is on the party asserting the privilege. That's from the Moyer v. Moyer case by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1992. Mr. Green, here, bears the burden of establishing the requirements of privilege.

Rule 502(a)(2) states -- and, again,

I'm quoting -- "A communication is 'confidential' if

not intended to be disclosed to third persons other

than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance

of the rendition of professional legal services ...."

Importantly, though, the parties' subjective expectation of confidentiality must be objectively reasonable. One cannot simply believe subjectively that the communication is confidential if the circumstances would not support a reasonable belief to that effect.

Here, the record establishes that

Green subjectively believed that his emails were

confidential. Dell, likewise, subjectively believed

that its communications with Green using his Accenture

account were confidential. But that's not

dispositive. People seem to think that their activities on the internet are confidential in many respects when they usually are not.

2.1

The real question here is whether

Green has carried its burden of proving that he had an objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality when using the Accenture email account.

The general rule is that although using email carries a risk of unauthorized disclosure, just like any other form of communication, lawyers and clients may communicate confidentially through unencrypted email with a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.

In the ordinary course of business, individuals who use a company-provided email system for company-related business have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the use of that system, and they can reasonably expect that outsiders to that privileged relationship will not be able to access the system or the communications. Under those circumstances, the fact that the company may monitor or access communications isn't problematic, because the company is aligned with the employee and there is no outsider to the relationship who is breaking the

confidentiality. Consequently, assuming a communication is otherwise privileged, use of a company-sponsored email system does not, without more, result in loss of the privilege; again, even if the company engages in monitoring.

Questions arise when an individual uses the company-sponsored email account on matters unrelated to the company's business, where the company can effectively be viewed as an outsider to the relationship. Under those circumstances, the user of the company-sponsored email account doesn't necessarily have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. Whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists is something that a court has to decide on a case-by-case basis. It's not a situation where we can establish bright-line rules, although certainly one can rely on precedent and on developing practices and things of that sort.

In terms of precedent in Delaware, we now have a few cases that address this issue. There's the *DLO Enterprises* case from 2020 by Vice Chancellor Zurn. There's the *Lynch v. Gonzalez* case from 2019, also by Vice Chancellor Zurn. There's the *WeWork* litigation case from 2020 by then-Chancellor Bouchard.

And then, somewhat more ancient, is the *Information*Management Services case that I wrote back in 2013.

All of these cases analyze the reasonable expectation of privacy using a four-factor test drawn from the

Asia Global case, which is a bankruptcy case out of

the Southern District of New York in 2005.

1 4

test focuses on the nature and specificity of the policies that the company providing the email account has regarding email use and monitoring. This factor will favor production when the company has a policy banning personal use or where the company informs users that they have no right to privacy in communications that use that email account.

When you have these types of outright bans or broad statements, the inquiry into whether there's an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy essentially ends at the start. But absent a complete ban like that, the inquiry is more nuanced. One can have a policy that would not lead to a reasonable expectation of privacy under some circumstances and would allow for a reasonable expectation of privacy in other circumstances, depending on the nature of the use.

I'm going to turn now to Accenture's policies. The parties have provided me with several of them. I think what matters is the policy that's in place when the communications are made. That's the one that the company is actually applying to the communications in question. Whether the employee or the user is on notice of that policy or thought there was a different policy in place or remembered a policy from earlier days can come in under other factors in the Asia Global test, most notably the fourth one, but I think what matters is the policy that's in place when the person is using the system.

think are substantively identical, or at least substantively consistent. One is the policy from 2012 that appears at Exhibit E to the Kirby transmittal affidavit. The other one, that I'm actually going to work from, is a policy from 2018 which, therefore, was the policy in place for most of the time. That is Exhibit 10 to the Weinberger declaration.

What these policies show is that

Accenture acknowledged that personal use was

permissible, that Accenture indicated that it would

respect personal use except in specific circumstances,

and also that Accenture would need to engage, and 1 2 would engage, in systemwide monitoring to protect the 3 entity and the system. The question is how you 4 reconcile those three things for purposes of the Asia Global factors.

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Now, I'll give you examples from the policy. And, again, I'm going to work off the 2018 one, just so I don't go through two of them.

The discussion of personal use starts in Section 3.1.2. It specifically authorizes personal use subject to the restrictions in the policy. And it says, "Personnel are permitted to use Devices and Technology, (including e-mail, internet and telephones) for limited personal use, provided such use is in compliance with all Company policies, applicable laws and regulations, and does not" -- and now there are three bullets: "Interfere with on-going work; Adversely affect the problem handling or security of Information; or Create a significant overload on Company Technology."

This is an acknowledgment that personal use is going to happen. The company, though, doesn't encourage personal use. It encourages people to use individual email accounts. And it also says

that "[p]ersonnel who wish to protect the privacy of
their personal communications or files ... should mark
such items clearly as 'private' or 'personal'." It
also encourages people to put their private
information in a separate folder.

2.1

As I indicated at the outset, notwithstanding that acknowledgment, the company reserves the right to monitor. Item 4 in this section says just that: "Notwithstanding the above, the Company maintains the right, subject to all applicable laws, regulations, agreements, and local policies" -- and I'm going to skip over some language here -- "to open items that are marked 'private' or 'personal' in some circumstances including but not limited to," and then there are four bullet points.

The first is if there is a reasonable suspicion that the communication is really not personal but is, in fact, business related. The second is if there's a reasonable suspicion that there's been a criminal offense or a similar breach of law. The third is that if access is needed in connection with a company-related litigation or an internal or external investigation. And then the last one simply acknowledges the possibility of inadvertent

access during the company's general monitoring activities that it engages in to protect its system.

I think the flagging of these items creates a sense in the reader of this policy that they have some expectation of privacy in using this system. This certainly isn't an exclusive list, but it suggests that some personal use is permitted and that the company won't freely access all personal information. This is particularly pertinent to Green, who, because of his retirement from the company, was essentially only engaged in non-company-related business. One could say it was all personal for him at that point.

In reaching this conclusion regarding the policy -- namely, that it allows some expectation of privacy -- I acknowledge that the policy in paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2 discloses that the company will engage in widespread activities to verify compliance with the policy. Essentially, there is an awful lot of systemic monitoring going on by the company to protect its interests.

These activities include -- and there's a list of six of them, but the first one is the most noteworthy, I think. "Monitoring [] some or

all incoming and outgoing e-mails including, if
necessary, monitoring e-mails marked 'personal',
'private' or 'sensitive' as well as personal webmail
accounts accessed via work provided systems)."

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So it seems to me that it would be going too far to say that the company has created a hands-off situation. It is saying that it is going to continue to engage in monitoring.

But nevertheless, I think the combination of these statements, particularly in Mr. Green's situation, is sufficient to create a reasonable expectation of privacy in his email account, to the extent that what he was doing complied with the policy. Namely, he wasn't interfering with anybody's ongoing work at the company. He wasn't affecting the company adversely. He wasn't creating a systemic overload. He wasn't engaging in anything that looked like illicit behavior or problematic behavior or anything of this sort. And there's zero suggestion in the record to indicate that Green would have had any reason to think that any of those situations were applicable or that there were circumstances that would cause the company to look at his emails more closely.

The case that is distinguishable from
the current situation, I believe, is WeWork. I

believe there, there was a stricter policy in play.

There were also differences in terms of the
involvement in the litigation of the sponsor of the
email system.

Here, I do think Accenture, because of
its relationship to Mr. Green, is more akin to a

its relationship to Mr. Green, is more akin to a third-party provider. It isn't all the way analogous to a Google or an AOL or a Hotmail, but because Mr. Green had retired and left Accenture's active employ, Accenture was providing him with services analogous to that.

2.1

with Accenture's less-intrusive policy, the purely personal use, and the relationship that's more akin to a service provider, I think that WeWork is distinguishable. As a result of that, I think the first factor counsels against production. And that really is the dominant factor in the four-factor analysis.

The second factor involves whether the employer actually engages in the monitoring or accessing of work email. Accenture says that it has never monitored Green, but I don't think that's the

inquiry. I don't think one looks at the individual in question. I think one looks at the practices of the organization.

2.1

Here, I think it's reasonable to infer that Accenture does, indeed, monitor, consistent with its policies, and that it does indeed access employee email when it believes that it has the need to do so, consistent with its policies. The fact that Accenture is a very large organization that has to do things to keep its systems safe makes it largely incomprehensible to me that it's not doing that.

I don't believe that the fact that there's no specific instance where someone can say that they've monitored Green is what is relevant in this factor. To the extent that I consider this factor, I do think it would favor production if the policy favored production.

The third factor asks about the extent to which some party outside the client-attorney relationship has access to the system. When you're dealing with a company-sponsored system, this factor is largely superfluous. It may still have salience when someone takes the additional step of, for example, using company resources to access a web-based

system.

We know from the Accenture policies that Accenture understands that someone may use their corporate terminal, their company terminal, to access a remote email account that they've created. If someone has taken the step to create that remote email account, that is a factor that counsels against production. It is an additional step to try to establish an expectation of privacy.

We don't have that here. What we have here is the use of Accenture's email account. If the policy were different, this factor would favor production. And viewed in isolation, this factor does favor production.

Relatedly, even the lesser things that Green could have done weren't done in this case. He didn't specifically mark things private. He didn't specifically put anything in the re: line to say it was confidential. He didn't put emails in a separate folder. He didn't use encryption. This factor, viewed separately, would favor production.

And then the final factor is whether the user is fairly on notice of the policy. The factor asks whether the user knew about the policy,

but I don't think you can just put your head in the sand. The question is, is the user fairly on notice of the policy that the company is following.

Here, Green acknowledges that he was generally aware of the policies. Iterations of them were put in place while he was the CEO. To the extent this factor applies and is considered, it would favor production.

I circle back to where I started,
which is what are the specific policies in this case
and do they create a reasonable expectation of privacy
for someone like Green, who has established a
relationship with the company where, essentially, all
he is doing is using his Accenture email account for
personal use.

And I think, under those circumstances, an objectively reasonable view of this relationship is that Green had good reason to think that his emails would not be accessed and would remain confidential, vis-a-vis the world and people like the plaintiff, unless he was engaging in some behavior that would raise suspicions at Accenture and cause them to have to do some type of investigation.

There's no indication that that was

the case. This is simply a situation where Green was using his Accenture email account. And so I think he did have a reasonable expectation of privacy under these circumstances.

2.1

All of this is not to say that using the type of corporate email account that Green used is not without risk. I think a strong argument can be made that the better course is for outside directors to have an email account that they can be confident is not subject to potential monitoring. One can debate whether that's one for each board or one for all of their boards, or whether it's a Gmail account or some other type of more-secure provider. Regardless, that type of corporate hygiene goes a long way to avoiding these types of motions.

Green obviously didn't do that, but I don't think that that fact, in this case, warrants ordering production of all of the emails that he exchanged using his Accenture account. I'm going to deny the motion to compel on that basis.

I'm grateful for everyone's time.

Thank you for listening to my ruling. I hope everyone has a good rest of the afternoon and a good weekend.

(Proceedings concluded at 4:50 p.m.)

## CERTIFICATE

I, JULIANNE LABADIA, Official Court
Reporter for the Court of Chancery of the State of
Delaware, Registered Diplomate Reporter, Certified
Realtime Reporter, and Delaware Notary Public, do
hereby certify that the foregoing pages numbered 3
through 59 contain a true and correct transcription of
the proceedings as stenographically reported by me at
the hearing in the above cause before the Vice
Chancellor of the State of Delaware, on the date
therein indicated, except for the rulings, which were
revised by the Vice Chancellor.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand at Wilmington, this 28th day of September, 2021.

/s/ Julianne LaBadia
----Julianne LaBadia

Julianne LaBadia
Official Court Reporter
Registered Diplomate Reporter
Certified Realtime Reporter
Delaware Notary Public