Showing 2 posts in rights.
In recent years, the tension between fiduciary duty principles and contract rights, particularly with respect to fiduciary duties in unincorporated entities, has received a great deal of attention from the members of the Delaware judiciary in their written opinions and in extrajudicial commentary.
On the one hand, many decisions of the Court of Chancery have held that fiduciary duties apply in unincorporated entities unless specific language eliminates those duties. On the other, Chief Justice Myron T. Steele wrote an article in the 2009 American Business Law Journal that stated, "Delaware courts should not apply default fiduciary duties even if the parties have not specifically provided for the elimination of fiduciary duties."
Although the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed whether fiduciary duties apply to unincorporated entities by default, it has held — in the 2010 case Nemec v. Shrader — that the exercise of contractual rights is not subject to fiduciary duties.
The tension between fiduciary duties and contract principles in unincorporated entities was visited again in the Court of Chancery's recent opinion in Paige Capital Management LLC v. Lerner Master Fund LLC. Although the court's opinion addressed many factual and legal issues, the facts of Paige as they relate to fiduciary duty issues are straightforward.
Michele and Christopher Paige, wife and husband, sought to enter the world of hedge fund management. They recruited Lerner Master Fund LLC, the investment arm of the Lerner family, founders of MBNA and current owners of the NFL's Cleveland Browns and English Premier League's Aston Villa Football Club, to provide the hedge fund with $40 million in "seed money" so that the Paiges could use the Lerners' investment to attract other qualified investors. The Lerner group became a limited partner of the hedge fund, but also signed a separate agreement with additional terms and conditions that were applicable to the Lerners' investment. Pursuant to this side agreement, the Lerners were not permitted to remove their investment from the hedge fund for three years, unless, among other things, the Paige entities breached the contract or a fiduciary duty. In exchange, the Lerners received reduced management fees, incentive payments and other benefits.
This decision covers the now familiar ground of a review of an interested transaction with a controlling parent company that is blessed by a dysfunctional special committee. After finding the transaction was not fairly negotiated, and not substantively fair as well, the Court has granted an unusual remedy. Rather than awarding money damages, the Court has ordered the deal be restructured to make it fair, by converting the preferred stock issued to the parent to non-voting common stock.
The opinion is also particularly interesting for its discussion of the role of the special committee used in this transaction. The committee apparently felt its role was to get the best terms in the deal proposed by the parent company to make it "fair," rather than to question whether the deal was in their company's best interest. The committee's assumption that they could not just say no was in error.
The decision also touches on the rights of bondholders when a major bondholder has its consent to redemption effectively purchased. The Court noted that it is not unusual for indenture covenants to preclude that vote buying, and the absence of such a prohibition here was fatal to the complaining bondholders.
[UPDATE: The Delaware Supreme Court affirms this decision on July 23, 2009.]Share