Showing 15 posts in Special Committees.
Under Delaware law, stockholders who wish to pursue a derivative claim on the corporation’s behalf face an important decision—whether to make a pre-suit demand on the board to handle the suit itself, or bring the suit oneself and plead that the board cannot disinterestedly and independently consider a pre-suit demand under the circumstances. Neither path is easy. More ›Share
Akorn Inc. v. Fresemus Kabi A.G., C.A. 2018-0300-JTL (May 22, 2018) and Sandys v. Pincus, C.A. 9512-CB (July 2, 2018)
Corporate investigations present complicated issue surrounding what must later be produced in litigation. Context means everything in those disputes. Discovery into the decision by a SLC is much more limited than in other litigation, for example. But these two transcript rulings are useful for their insights into how the Court of Chancery handles disputes over discovery into the investigation process. More ›Share
Under the famous Zapata decision, a board of directors may take control of a derivative case, provided it meets the test set out in that opinion. But may such a board, or the managers in an LLC, delegate that authority to a non-member? This decision says that delegation is not appropriate for an LLC with a management structure similar to a corporation or in an LLC that limits the delegation authority of it member-managers.Share
When should the recommendations of a SLC to not pursue a derivative suit be accepted? As this opinion points out, certainly not when the defendants appoint their relative to the SCL and those that are indebted to them. Nor will the SCL be respected when its members approach their investigation with views fixed before their investigation was performed and when their non-Delaware counsel does not understand Delaware law.
This decision summarizes the Zapata principles for examining the report of a SLC, including a good summary of prior case law. Apart from the basic rules it sets down on burden of proof, independence and the scope of any SLC investigation [all of which alone are worth reading], the decision's analysis of the internal logic of the SLC report is critical. Put simply, the Court wants the report to make sense under an objective review and when it does not, trouble will follow.Share
This is a major decision with implications for all special committees. The Court denied a motion to dismiss, because the special committee did not stand up to the controlling stockholder. That much is not news. But the decision goes on to at least suggest that a special committee may have more than just the duty to say "no." In addition, a special committee needs to act affirmatively to make the controlling stockholder follow his fiduciary duties.
The decision is very fact specific, and the Court makes it clear that the context of a motion to dismiss strongly affected its analysis. However, it is also clear that those who predicted that Lyondell v. Chemical Co v. Ryan, 970 A2d 235 (Del. 2009) marked a lessening of scrutiny of board action may be wrong.Share
Sutherland v. Sutherland, C.A. 2399-VCL (Del. Ch. May 5, 2008)
Once again, the Court of Chancery has shot down a motion to dismiss a derivative suit based on the work of a one person SLC. This time while finding the SLC was independent, the Court felt its work was not adequate because of a lack of effort in reviewing accounting records.
The opinion is a useful collection of SLC law, particularly what not to do if you are going to use a SLC.Share
Young v. Klaassan, C.A. 2770-VCL (Del. Ch. April 25, 2008)
The use of a special committee of the board to avoid derivative suits over allegations of breach of duty is well recognized. What is less well known is how to use the work of such a committee. Here the defendants improperly argued that a derivative suit should be dismissed because of the conclusions of a special committee formed after the complaint was filed. That use of information not alleged in the complaint converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and thereby permitted discovery into the work of the special committee.
The opinion also notes the "unusual" nature of the special committee in this case. The committee did not issue a report, barely had its existence disclosed, and otherwise proceeded irregularly. One has to wonder why it was even formed if it was to act so poorly.Share
In re infoUSA, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, Consol. C.A. No. 1956-CC (March 17, 2008).
A special litigation committee was formed by the board of infoUSA, Inc. at the end of December, after a motion to dismiss derivative litigation had been denied and after a finding had been made by the Court of Chancery that demand was excused. The SLC moved to stay the ongoing derivative litigation in January, seeking a period of 150 days in which it could investigate the substance of the claims in the action. The plaintiffs opposed such a stay, asserting that the SLC was formed "too late" and should not be allowed to derail the ongoing litigation.
The Court of Chancery rejected this position: "The fact that I have already determined that demand is excused demonstrates why the board must act by means of a special committee; it does not in any way explain why it cannot act through an SLC." Consequently, the requested stay was granted. The Court also rejected as premature any challenge to the independence of the SLC, finding it serves the purposes of judicial economy to do so after the SLC issues its report. The letter opinion can be viewed here.Share
Ryan v. Gifford, C.A. No. 2213-CC (January 2, 2008).
This is an interesting decision because it points out how to do almost everything wrong in using a special committee to investigate accusations of misconduct. The result is that any privilege from disclosure that the work of the special committee may have enjoyed was completely lost and all of its extensive efforts were ordered to be turned over to the plaintiffs in the underlying litigation.
The decision also points out the limits on what its holding may have been in other contexts where the special committee's work was properly used and its privileges maintained.Share
In re Triarc Companies, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 16700, 2006 WL 903338 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2006). After the voluntary dismissal of a class action, plaintiffs petitioned the Court of Chancery for attorneys' fees and expenses. The court found that plaintiffs' counsel was entitled to fees for the preparation of the amended complaint and litigation efforts undertaken before the action that caused the voluntary dismissal. Plaintiffs' counsel was not entitled to fees for their work in connection with the original complaint nor for their work performed after the claims in the amended complaint were mooted. More ›Share