The parties agreed to a prompt closing because they did not expect significant antitrust scrutiny. As Vice Chancellor Bonnie W. David explained, the parties were not competitors and “did not have a vertical supplier-customer relationship.” As a factual matter, however, the acquirer decided not to continue to provide certain “enhanced” services to one of its customers that competed with the target. Unbeknownst to the parties, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) had spoken with the customer about the cessation of those “enhanced” services. The conversation led the FTC to investigate and analyze a “market reset theory” that focused on the incentives post-merger not to provide services to potential competitors.
The FTC’s information requests asked about anticipated cessations of services to customers. The acquirer’s responses omitted mention of the customer at issue because, it later explained, it expected to continue to provide that customer with other, standardized services. But in any event, at trial, it was shown that the acquirer’s failure to respond with the information the FTC requested caused the FTC to seek more information as part of a longer-than-expected review process. The FTC did not approve the merger by the closing date.
The merger agreement provided that a party could not exercise a termination right if the terminating party itself was in “material breach” of the merger agreement or if its “other willful conduct” was the “primary cause” of the failure to satisfy a closing condition. The Court of Chancery reasoned, inter alia, that the “willful conduct” standard required only “voluntary and intentional” conduct. In this regard, the Court agreed with the acquirer that, unlike in many broken deal cases, the record did not support the acquirer acted intentionally to delay or prevent closing. The Court reasoned, however, that the “willful conduct” standard did not require a culpable state of mind. The Court also found, as a factual matter, the acquirer’s conduct was the “primary cause” of the longer-than-expected FTC investigation.
The Court of Chancery accordingly granted specific performance and required the acquirer to perform under the merger agreement, including by using “commercially reasonable efforts” to obtain antitrust clearance and to close the merger if the FTC approves the transaction. In so ruling, the Court also rejected the acquirer’s argument that the target’s communications with other potential acquirers, after the acquirer’s purported termination of the merger, was itself a “material breach” of the merger agreement’s exclusivity provisions that should render specific performance unavailable.