Showing 8 posts from August 2007.
Superior Court Holds Measure of Damages in Quasi-Contract Action is Value of Services Provided, Not Benefit Received
This case sets forth the appropriate measure of damages under a quasi-contract theory (in this instance quantum meruit): the value of the services provided, not the value of the benefit received.
The plaintiff made a typical business loan to the defendant to be paid back with interest, but also agreed to provide additional services to help the defendant avoid foreclosure on other loans, reduce the businesses debt load, and restore profitability. In return for these services, the defendant offered the plaintiff a partnership interest in the business.
But when the business improved, the defendant allegedly stopped working with the plaintiff—and eventually sold the business for a profit. More ›Share
Highfields Capital LTD. v. AXA Financial Inc., C.A. No. 804-VCL (August 17, 2007).
This decision illustrates the point that in an appraisal proceeding the type of business involved may lead to a different approach to valuation. Typically, Delaware courts use the discounted cash flow method to set an appraisal value. Here, however, the Court held that a combined sum of the parts and shared synergies analysis was more appropriate for an insurance company valuation.Share
Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware) Incorporated, C.A. No. 2226-VCS (August 14, 2007).
In a precedent setting opinion, the Court of Chancery has recast the standard of review that applies when determining if a board has acted to affect a stockholder vote. Under the previous Blasius standard, the board had to prove a "compelling justification" before taking any action, such as postponing a stockholder meeting, that affected the stockholders' right to vote.
This opinion recasts the standard closer to the familiar Unocal test where director action that affected a proposed takeover had to be a reasonable response to a perceived threat to corporate policy or interests. Now, in the case of board action that may affect the stockholders' vote, the board must show its actions were: (1) designed to achieve a legitimate corporate objective; (2) taken for a proper motive in good faith; and (3) were reasonable means to their proper objective. This test should be substantially easier to meet than the "compelling justification" standard.Share
In this action alleging violations of ERISA and state contract law, Defendants moved to dismiss two of the claims under F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff’s husband was employed by one of the defendants. Plaintiff brought the action against the employer and its insurance company, alleging that Defendants wrongfully denied her claim under an employee welfare benefit plan after her husband was killed while on a business trip. She alleged that defendants wrongfully denied benefits under ERISA, breached fiduciary duties owed under ERISA, and violated state contract law. Defendants moved to dismiss the fiduciary breach and state contract claims. The Court allowed the breach of fiduciary duties claim, but dismissed the state contract claim.
Law Debenture Trust Company of New York v. Petrohawk Energy Corp., C.A. No. 2422-VCS (August 1, 2007).
Change of control provisions are common in employment contracts and other contexts. Here the provision was in a debenture. While primarily focusing on the specific language involved, this opinion is useful to others to see how to avoid triggering a change in control provision while at the same time implementing a merger.Share
Superior Court Holds Punitive Damages Are Not Precluded Where Separate Tort Claim Exists Alongside Contract Claims
Data Mgmt. Int’l v. Saraga, C.A. No. 05C-05-108, 2007 WL 2142848 (Del. Super. Ct. July 25, 2007).
Generally, a plaintiff bringing a claim based entirely upon the breach of a contract must sue in contract and is limited to contract remedies. No tort exists merely because a party breaches a contract—even if intentionally. But, the same conduct upon which the breach of contract claim is grounded may give rise to a tort claim if the conduct independently amounts to the breach of such an independent duty imposed by law. And with a tort claim comes the availability of punitive damages. More ›
In this action alleging, inter alia, bad faith breach of contract and consumer fraud, the defendant insurance company sought dismissal of those counts pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Plaintiffs held an insurance policy with Defendant that contained provisions covering credit card fraud and check forgery. Plaintiffs submitted a claim pursuant to those provisions for over $250,000 in allegedly fraudulent credit card charges and forged checks. Nearly one year later, Defendant tendered payment of $10,000 for the claim, contending that this amount represented the maximum amount due under the policy. Plaintiffs argued that the policy provided broader coverage, and alleged that Defendant denied or delayed payment on Plaintiffs’ claim without reasonable justification. Defendants argued that there was a bona fide dispute as to the policy’s language, such that Defendant could not be found to have acted unreasonably. Defendant also argued that Plaintiffs did not plead consumer fraud with particularity. The Court denied Defendant’s motion, finding that Plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to state both the bad faith and consumer fraud claims. More ›Share
Feldman v. Cutaia, C.A. No. 1656-VCL (August 1, 2007), affrimed, Del Supr. (May 30, 2008).
Classifying a claim as derivative has big consequences. Among those is that the claim is then subject to the continuous ownership rule that requires the plaintiff to hold his shares throughout the litigation to maintain his standing. A merger that eliminates the plaintiff's ownership thus also eliminates his ability to proceed with a derivative suit.
In an effort to avoid this problem, plaintiffs that bring dilution claims asserting their interests have been wrongfully diminished need to fit into an exception to the general rule that dilution claims are derivative. This decision illustrates the limits on such claims. Basically, a dilution claim is derivative unless the claim is that a controlling stockholder has wrongly diluted the interests of the minority stockholders. For this purpose, "control" means having a greater than 50% interest or active domination of a board. Moreover, it is not possible to aggregate the stock holdings of a group of stockholders to get over the 50% threshold.
This opinion also discusses the exceptions to the general rule that a merger deprives a stockholder of standing, such as when the merger itself is an attempt to fraudulently end the derivative suit. It also notes that aiding and abetting claims based on derivative claims are themselves also derivative and subject to the same standing rules.Share