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Summaries and analysis of recent Delaware court decisions concerning business-related litigation.
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Showing 30 posts in Dissolution.
Under the LLC Act, as with the DGCL, an entity planning to dissolve and distribute its assets is required to set aside some reserve of assets to pay all known claims. Failure to set aside sufficient assets may result in revocation of the entity’s certificate of cancellation, thereby reviving the entity, as happened in this case. This decision explains when claims are “known” by the entity (i.e., the entity has actual knowledge of the claims) and how the entity may value those claims for purposes of retaining sufficient assets to potentially satisfy them. Importantly, the reserve need not match all potential damages dollar-for-dollar. The value of claims may be discounted based on their lack of merit, for example.
On the same day the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the widely-reported TransPerfect decision, which ordered the sale of a successful company by custodian under Section 226 of the DGCL in order to break deadlock, the Court of Chancery issued this decision appointing a custodian of a Delaware corporation with limited powers to break a deadlock. The decision carefully explains the reason why a custodian should be appointed and why the custodian’s powers should be limited. In that sense, this is a “normal” custodian case not involving the very unusual circumstances the Court of Chancery had to deal with in TransPerfect.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the Court of Chancery decision that Section 226 of the DGCL permits the Court to appoint a custodian to sell a Delaware corporation when the board of directors and stockholders are deadlocked and the company is suffering as a result.
Zebala v. Aminopterin LLC, C.A. No. 12186-VCS (September 28, 2016) (TRANSCRIPT)
An issue of some debate is whether a non-Delaware court has the power to dissolve a Delaware entity. Here, the Court of Chancery was asked to dismiss a later-filed dissolution action in Delaware based on a California forum selection clause in the parties’ LLC agreement, and in deference to a long-pending first-filed action in California where the court had already issued an injunction restricting the LLC’s assets that the Court of Chancery was being asked to wind up. The Court thus had the opportunity to address the important power to dissolve question, but under the circumstances found it appropriate to defer to the California court relying on principles of comity and a McWane analysis to dismiss the dissolution action. In other words, the Court of Chancery would not step on the California court’s toes under the circumstances, and the California court could decide for itself if it has the power to dissolve a Delaware entity should the parties present that issue there.
This is an interesting decision in a small case. The Court granted the request to dissolve a Delaware entity in deadlock, but conditioned that dissolution on an agreement not to use the fact of dissolution in another proceeding between the parties to defeat a party’s standing. What other conditions might be imposed in other cases remains to be seen.
This decision may answer the question of whether an LLC Agreement’s bar of dissolution without a member’s consent trumps the statutory remedy of court-ordered dissolution when the entity’s purpose cannot be achieved any longer. It concludes that dissolution is proper under the facts presented where the objecting member really had no good reason to object.
In this precedent-setting decision, the Court upholds the right of an assignee of an LLC interest to petition for its dissolution. The LLC Act itself limits a dissolution petition to managers or members, but drawing on precedent upholding the broad powers of a court of equity, the Court holds that an equitable remedy exists that permits an assignee to also seek dissolution.
This is an interesting case because the Court grants specific performance of an somewhat vague contract and that breaks what would otherwise have been a stockholder deadlock. It has a good outline of the law of specific performance.
A party aggrieved by a trial court's decision may seek a stay while it appeals. To win a stay, it must satisfy the so-called "Kirpat" test, particularly its requirement of irreparable harm absent a stay. This decision illustrates the analysis of the Kirpat factors.
The liability of a custodian or receiver for a dissolving corporation is not clear. Judicial immunity does protect him from many claims, but as this decision points out, not from all claims. The discussion of what claims are or are not barred by immunity is particularly helpful for anyone assuming the role of a custodian or receiver.
It is often said that the Court of Chancery will not stay or dismiss an action filed under one of the statutory provisions for summary adjudication of a claim, such as to decide a proxy contest, because there is prior litigation filed elsewhere. That is generally true, but not always and this decision involves 1 of the rare exceptions. Here the plaintiff sought a decree of dissolution by his complaint filed several months after a similar claim was filed by the other side in New Jersey. Noting that any decision by it would impact a preliminary ruling by the New Jersey court, the Court of Chancery dismissed its case to avoid such a conflict.
In this case the Court appointed a receiver for an insolvent corporation under Section 291 of the DGCL. The Court reasoned that the appointment was needed to break a deadlock over whether to implement a proposed tax strategy when there was little time left to deal with the IRS. This illustrates when a receiver may be appointed to make business decisions.
This decision upholds the power of the Court of Chancery to appoint a receiver for a dissolved Delaware corporation to collect on the corporation's insurance polices covering asbestos claims. This may be done even more than 10 years after formal dissolution and provides a way to pursue insurance coverage despite the general law that prohibits direct claims against an insurer.
See also the Supreme Court's reversal of part of the Court's ruling at Anderson v. krafft-Murphy Company, Inc. Del Sup. C.A. 85, 2013 ( November 26, 2013).
In this case the limited partnership agreement had a detailed method for dissolving the entity and paying the proceeds to the limited partners, including how to set the sale price if its assets were sold to a related party. The General Partner approved such a sale and followed the prescribed method. When the plaintiff argued the result was less than optimal, the Court held that was too bad when the partnership agreement was followed. In short, the "contract" among the partners was again enforced.