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Showing 198 posts in M&A.

Chancery Dismisses Challenge to Top Executives’ Stock Awards in Disney-Fox Merger, Finds Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Pursue Derivative Claim

Brokerage Jamie Goldenberg Komen Rev TRU U/A 06/10/08 Jamie L Komen Trustee for the Benefit of Jamie Goldenberg Komen v. Breyer, C.A. No. 2018-0773-AGB (Del. Ch. June 26, 2020)

Following a merger that alters a stockholder’s ownership status, the stockholder may be able to challenge the entirety of the merger as a direct claim, but the stockholder will typically lack standing to challenge the individual aspects of the merger as derivative claims. The instant case, involving the Disney-Fox merger, shows the difficulties a stockholder faces in attempting to mount such a challenge. More ›

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Court of Chancery Dismisses Aiding and Abetting Claim Against NetSuite’s Fiduciaries for Role in Alleged Overpayment by Oracle

In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig, Consol. C.A. No. 2017-0337-SG (Del. Ch. June 22, 2020)

At the pleadings stage, a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty requires that it is reasonably conceivable that the alleged aider and abettor knowingly provided substantial assistance in the breach of fiduciary duty. This decision reflects that substantial assistance in an alleged conspiracy of silence might not meet the reasonably conceivable standard if public statements and securities filings contain sufficient information about the underlying course of conduct. More ›

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In Post-Trial Opinion, Chancery Finds for Defendant, Rejecting Claims Alleging Breach of Purchase Agreement and Right to “Board Packages”

Braga Investment & Advisory, LLC v. Yenni Income Opportunities Fund I, L.P., C.A. No. 2017-0393-AGB (Del. Ch. June 8, 2020)

In this post-trial opinion, the Court of Chancery held in favor of defendant Yenni Income Opportunities Fund I, L.P. (the “Fund”) finding that the Fund was not required to obtain the signature of Braga Investment & Advisory, LLC (“Braga”) as a “Buyer” when it executed a side letter agreement (the “Side Letter”), nor had the Fund breached a co-investment agreement by denying Braga access to certain materials in connection with its position as a board observer. More ›

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Chancery Applies Contract’s Choice of Law to Related Fraud Claims, Declines to Dismiss Fraud Claims Where Contract Lacked Clear Anti-Reliance Language

The Anshutz Corp. v. Brown Robin Cap., LLC, 2019-0710-JRS (Del. Ch. June 11, 2020)

In dealing with what the Court of Chancery called “a version of a [commercial] dispute as old and abiding as commerce itself,” the Court provides insights useful to drafters of both pleadings and contracts. More ›

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Chancery Finds Pre-Closing Privilege Did Not Transfer to Buyer Under Asset Purchase Agreement

Posted In Discovery, M&A, Privilege

DLO Enterprises, Inc. v. Innovative Chemical Products Group, LLC, C.A. No. 2019-0276-MTZ (Del. Ch. June 1, 2020).

Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs (“Buyers”) acquired substantially all of the assets of Arizona Polymer Flooring, Inc., later renamed DLO Enterprises, Inc. (“Sellers”). Sellers filed this action disputing who was financially responsible for certain defective products. During discovery, Sellers produced several pre-closing communications with their counsel that were redacted in part to protect the privilege. Buyers filed a motion to compel unredacted copies of the documents. More ›

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Court of Chancery Sustains Aiding-and-Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Against Financial Advisor Based on its Conflicts of Interest in Going-Private Transaction

Morrison v. Berry, C.A. No. 12808-VCG (Del. Ch. June 1, 2020)

Even if fiduciary duty of care claims against a target company’s board of directors are exculpated, an aiding-and-abetting claim against a financial advisor to the board may survive a motion to dismiss when the advisor is alleged to have knowingly misled the board and prevented the board from running a reasonable sales process. More ›

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CCLD Offers Guidance on the Application of Tolling Doctrines to M&A Agreement Clauses Modifying the Statute of Limitations for Representations and Warranties Claims

AssuredPartners of Virginia, LLC v. Sheehan, C.A. No. N19C-02-175 AML CCLD (Del. Super. Ct. May 29, 2020)

A disgruntled buyer brought suit against its seller for breaches of representations and warranties four years after the execution of the applicable asset purchase agreement (“APA”). The APA contained a clause providing that certain representations and warranties survived for two (2) years post-closing except for those fraudulently given, which survived from closing until sixty days after expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The defendant-sellers sought dismissal of the breach claims as untimely, requiring Judge Abigail M. LeGrow of the Superior Court of Delaware to determine whether the doctrine of tolling applied to the APA’s survival clause and if the parties intended to contractually extend the statute of limitations for fraudulent representation claims under 10 Del. C. § 8106(c). More ›

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Delaware Superior Court CCLD Addresses Claim of Common Interest Privilege over Merger Agreement Parties’ Post-Signing, Pre-Closing Communications

Posted In CCLD, Discovery, M&A, Privilege

The American Bottling Co. v. Repole, C.A. No. N19C-03-048 AML CCLD (Del. Super. May 12, 2020)

Delaware courts will apply the common interest doctrine when two parties, represented by counsel, exchange privileged information with one another concerning a legal matter in which they have a shared interest. To maintain the privilege, the common interest must involve predominantly legal issues, rather than a common economic interest in a commercial venture. If there is no common interest, a party who shares privileged materials with a third-party will generally waive the privilege.  More ›

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Chancery Dismisses Claims that Minority Stockholders who Rolled Over Equity in a Controlling Stockholder Merger Joined a “Control Group”

Gilbert v. Perlman, C.A. No. 2018-0453-SG (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2020)

Delaware law imposes fiduciary duties upon controlling stockholders who use their power to control the corporate machinery. For that reason, determining who comprises a control group affects who may owe fiduciary duties. In some circumstances, where minority stockholders pool their interests to gain majority control and then bind themselves to act together to effectuate a transaction, minority stockholders may take on the duties of a controlling stockholder as members of a control group. But where an already existing controlling stockholder effectuates a cash-out merger, minority stockholders who roll over their shares and enter into a voting agreement to support the transaction will not be deemed part of a control group unless a plaintiff can plead that “the minority-holder’s participation [was] material to the controller’s scheme to exercise control of the entity, leading to the controller ceding some of its control power to the minority-holders.” More ›

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Chancery Finds Corporation Fraudulently Induced Investor into Contract, Acting “Through Concealment and Silence”

Maverick Therapeutics Inc. v. Harpoon Therapeutics, Inc., C.A. No. 2019-0002-SG (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2020).

In this post-trial opinion, the Court of Chancery found that Harpoon Therapeutics, Inc., (“Harpoon”), a Delaware corporation in the business of developing novel cancer therapies, fraudulently induced an investor into acquiring an interest in one of its business divisions by intentionally drafting a non-compete narrowly to exclude certain opportunities Harpoon wished to pursue, in contrast with its representations to the investor about its future plans. More ›

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Surveying the Law, Chancery Declines to Dismiss a Claim that a 35% Holder was the Controlling Stockholder of the Acquirer (as Well as the Target)

Voigt v Metcalf, C.A. No. 2018-0828-JTL (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2020).

This decision contains an instructive review of the factors the Court of Chancery will examine to determine whether a minority stockholder may in fact be a controlling stockholder in the circumstances of a specific transaction – an area of the law that has assumed increased importance after Corwin. More ›

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Chancery Holds That Res Judicata Precludes Plaintiff’s Claim for Information Rights Under Merger Agreement

Posted In Chancery, M&A

Fortis Advisors LLC v. Shire US Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0933-JRS (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2020).

The doctrine of res judicata bars a plaintiff from splitting claims arising from a single transaction into multiple actions. As this decision illustrates, the requirement to plead all claims arising from a transaction in a lawsuit to avoid claim preclusion on res judicata grounds may include a claim for information rights arising from a merger agreement. A party with information rights should carefully evaluate those rights when bringing a claim for breach of contract, and should not assume that subsequent claims for information rights under the contract will avoid claim preclusion under the doctrine of res judicata. More ›

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Chancery Finds Pleadings Sufficient to Support Claim that a Corporate Self-Tender Offer was Coercive

Posted In Chancery, M&A

Davidow v. LRN Corp., C.A. No. 2019-0150-MTZ (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 2020).

Delaware law does not invoke the entire fairness test for a voluntary, noncoercive offer by a corporation to buy its own shares. But, as this decision illustrates, Delaware courts will apply the entire fairness test where the self-tender is coercive or the board is interested or lacks independence in approving the transaction. More ›

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Appraisal of Panera Bread: Court of Chancery Again Defers to Deal Price, Denies Request for a Refund of the Amount of Synergies

Posted In Appraisal, M&A

In re Appraisal of Panera Bread Co., C.A. No. 2017-0593-MTZ (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020).

JAB Holdings B.V. (“JAB”), a private company that also owns Einstein Bros., Caribou Coffee and Krispy Kreme, acquired Panera Bread Company (“Panera”) via a cash-out merger for $315.00 per share on July 18, 2017. Multiple dissenting shareholders (the “Petitioners”) filed an appraisal action, asserting that the fair value of their shares was $361.00 per share. Post-trial, the Court of Chancery disagreed with the Petitioners, ruling that the deal price minus synergies was the best evidence of fair value. This was because Panera had followed a reliable sale process and any flaws in that process did not undermine its reliability. Specifically, the Court held that, among other factors, the parties’ arm’s length negotiations, Panera’s disinterested and independent board, price increases during negotiations, the fact that no other parties bid on Panera either before or after the announcement of the merger, and the outreach that Panera did with potential buyers provided persuasive evidence of a reliable sale process. More ›

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Chancery Dismisses Stockholder Claims that a Minority Owner was a Controlling Stockholder or that a Majority of the Board was Beholden to the Minority Owner in Approving a Merger Transaction with the Minority Owner

In re: Essendant, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2018-0789-JRS (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2019).

When as here a Delaware corporation’s charter contains an exculpation provision under Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, stockholders who bring suit against directors who approve a merger transaction must allege violations of the duty of loyalty to state a non-exculpated claim. They may state such a claim if they adequately plead that a controlling stockholder breached duties for self-interested reasons, or that a majority of the board was self-interested or beholden to the buyer. They may also attempt to state a non-exculpated claim by claiming that a majority of the board acted in bad faith. To meet this bad faith standard, a plaintiff must plead facts showing that the decision to approve the transaction lacked any rationally conceivable basis associated with maximizing stockholder value. As the Court explained, allegations of mis- or non-disclosure will not suffice unless plaintiffs plead intentional misstatements or omissions based on a “factual narrative that would allow any inferential explanation of why these fiduciaries would so abandon their duties as to engage in bad faith." (emphasis in original). More ›

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