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Summaries and analysis of recent Delaware court decisions concerning business-related litigation.

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Showing 178 posts in M&A.

Chancery Determines Appraisal “Fair Value” Below Merger Consideration, Questions Judicial Notice of Valuation Scholarship

Posted In Appraisal, M&A

In re Appraisal of Jarden Corp., Consol. C.A. No. 12456-VCS (Del. Ch. July 19, 2019).

This decision presents another cautionary tale for stockholders of a target public company who consider seeking statutory appraisal instead of accepting the merger consideration. More ›

Chancery Denies Motion to Dismiss Claim for Breach of Earn-Out When Unable to “Divine any Meaning” From Provision

Posted In Breach of Contract, M&A

Western Standard, LLC v. SourceHOV Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0280-JRS (Del. Ch. July 24, 2019).

Defendant Pangea acquired BancTec through a merger agreement that provided for an earn-out to former BancTec stockholders in the event that Pangea’s controlling stockholder realized certain returns on its post-merger stock.  Plaintiff alleged that the earn-out was triggered when Pangea’s parent company became a wholly owned subsidiary of another company through a stock-for-stock transaction. More ›

Chancery Dismisses Merger Challenge Concerning Board’s Delegation of Merger Negotiations and Management’s Undisclosed Compensation Discussions

Posted In Fiduciary Duty, M&A

In re Towers Watson & Co. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2018-0132-KSJM (Del. Ch. July 25, 2019).

The ultimate responsibility for considering a merger falls on the board to carry out consistent with each director's fiduciary duties.  But management usually takes the lead role in negotiating with the counterparty.  It is not uncommon for stockholder plaintiffs to make hay out of a board allowing potentially conflicted members of management to pick up that mantle.  Sometimes those circumstances support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty and sometimes they do not.  This motion to dismiss decision addresses claims in that context, with the Court of Chancery finding the case falls in the latter category. More ›

Chancery Upholds Adequacy of Description of Buyer’s Indemnification Claims but Finds Indemnification Request for Pending Litigation Unripe Because Buyer Failed to Allege it Had “Incurred” Losses

Horton v. Organogenesis Inc.,C.A. No. 2018-0537-KSJM (Del. Ch. July 22, 2019).

Sellers in merger agreements generally agree to indemnify buyers for certain “Losses” but require the buyers to provide timely notice of claims.  Whether an indemnification claim succeeds depends on the language the parties use to define the indemnification obligation. In Horton, the seller agreed that indemnification claims would survive if the buyer provided by June 24, 2018 written notice “stating in sufficient detail the nature of, and factual and legal basis for, any such claim for indemnification” and an estimate and calculation of the amount of Losses, if known, resulting therefrom. The buyer timely sent a notice of indemnification with one-paragraph descriptions of the factual and legal basis of each of its five claims, which it said “may involve breaches of representations and warranties in the Merger Agreement.” It also sought a second category of indemnification for Losses arising out of pending litigation. As to the first category, the Court found the buyer’s one-paragraph descriptions sufficient even though the buyer did not specify the specific sections of the merger agreement it claimed were breached. This was because “sellers are charged with knowledge of their representations and warranties in the Merger Agreement.” As to the second category, the Court granted the seller’s motion to dismiss without prejudice, because the buyer had not adequately pleaded that it had incurred any costs, fees or adverse judgments in the litigation.

Court of Chancery Addresses Stockholder Standing to Enforce Corporate Contracts, Declines to Dismiss Claim for Breach of Anti-Takeover Protections Akin to Section 203 of the DGCL

Posted In M&A

Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. Alon USA Energy, Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0453-KSJM (Del. Ch. Jun. 28, 2019).

Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, an anti-takeover statute, prohibits a target from entering into a business combination with an acquirer for three years from the date that the acquirer first obtains 15% or more of the target’s stock, unless the target’s board pre-approves the transaction crossing the 15% threshold.  Here, to avoid Section 203’s three-year anti-takeover period, an acquirer sought pre-approval of its acquisition of a 48% block of shares.  The target’s board agreed, but on the condition that the acquirer enter into an agreement that retained Section 203’s three-year standstill period for one year.  A stockholder-plaintiff later brought suit arguing the acquirer failed to comply with the one-year standstill, and thus breached the agreement.  It also argued the acquirer’s breach of the agreement to shorten Section 203’s three-year standstill period to one year in effect revived the longer period, such that the merger was void ab initio under the DGCL.  When the defendants moved to dismiss claiming the stockholder-plaintiff lacked standing to enforce the target corporation’s agreement with the acquirer, the Court held that the stockholder sufficiently alleged it had standing as an intended third-party beneficiary.  The Court reasoned that provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law have been likened to a contract that stockholders may enforce by suing directly.  Section 203 in particular was enacted to benefit stockholders by limiting hostile takeovers and encouraging fair, non-coercive acquisition offers.  Here, the target’s agreement with the acquirer adopted those protections for the same apparent purpose of directly benefitting stockholders. More ›

Citing Trulia and Walgreens Decisions, Federal District Court Orders Plaintiffs’ Counsel to Return Agreed-Upon Mootness Fee

Posted In Class Actions, M&A, Settlements

House v. Akorn, Inc., Consol. Nos. 17-C-5018, 17-C-5022, 17-C-5026 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 24, 2019).

Disclosure-only settlements of stockholder class actions have received increased scrutiny following the Delaware Court of Chancery’s Trulia decision in 2016 and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ Walgreens decision later that year.  Those decisions observed the problem of M&A strike suits, expressed disfavor of disclosure-only settlements in M&A class actions, and significantly raised the bar for getting the required court approval of such settlements.  One consequence has been many M&A suits migrating from the Delaware Court of Chancery to federal courts around the country.  Another has been defendants more frequently acting to voluntarily moot the claimed disclosure violations through supplemental disclosures.  In that instance, the parties then face the choice of either litigating the appropriate mootness fee award to plaintiffs’ counsel for the supplemental disclosures prompted by their claims or, alternatively, privately negotiating the mootness fee award and thus avoiding the judicial process, provided no other stockholders object to the negotiated award.  More ›

Merger Agreement’s Preservation of Privilege for Pre-Merger Communications Found to be Adequate, Notwithstanding that the Surviving Company Took Possession of E-Mails

Shareholder Representative Services LLC v. RSI Holdco, LLC, C.A. No. 2018-0517-KSJM (Del. Ch. May 29, 2019).

This decision confirms that, in a post-merger dispute between an acquirer and the selling stockholders, broad contractual language can prevent a waiver of the acquired company's privileged pre-merger communications, even if the surviving company takes physical possession of the communications. RSI Holdco, LLC acquired Radixx Systems International, Inc. in 2016, and the merger agreement designated Shareholder Representative Services LLC as representative of Radixx's selling shareholders. As part of the merger, RSI Holdco acquired Radixx’s computers and email servers, which contained 1200 pre-merger emails between Radixx and its counsel; Radixx had not excised or segregated the communications from other data. However, the merger agreement contained a detailed provision that (1) preserved Radixx’s privilege, (2) assigned it the representative of selling stockholders, (3) required the parties to take steps to ensure that the privilege remained in effect, and (4) prevented RSI Holdco from relying on the privileged communications in post-merger litigation. In Great Hill Equity Partners IV, LP v. SIG Growth Equity Fund I, LLLP, 80 A.3d 155 (Del. Ch. 2013), the Court had found that privilege transferred to the surviving company in a merger as a matter of law pursuant to section 259 of the DGCL because (i) the parties did not address privilege in the merger agreement, and (ii) because the at-issue communications were turned over. Great Hill cautioned future parties to "use their contractual freedom" to exclude privileged communications from the transferred assets. Here, the Court rejected RSI Holdco's argument that the failure to excise the communications waived privilege in this circumstance, and the Court noted that even if the privilege had been waived, the merger agreement still prevented RSI Holdco from relying on the communications in the litigation. Thus, the Court concluded that the sellers "heeded the Great Hill court's advice" and found the detailed provision in the merger agreement preserved the privilege attached to the pre-merger communications.

Delaware Supreme Court Rejects MFW Defense Because of Delay in Safeguards

Posted In M&A

Olenik v. Lodzinksi, No. 392, 2018 (Del. Apr. 5, 2019).


Under Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014), deferential business judgment review governs mergers between a controlling stockholder and the controlled corporation when the deal is conditioned “ab initio” on two procedural safeguards. Those are approval by (i) a special committee of independent directors, and (ii) an uncoerced, informed majority-of-the-minority stockholders’ vote. The reasoning goes, with so-called “MFW conditions” in place at the outset, a controller cannot dictate the economic terms or unduly influence the stockholder vote, thus ameliorating the concerns otherwise justifying the more exacting “entire fairness” review. More ›

Chancery Enjoins Unfair Merger Pending Corrective Disclosures, But Declines to Order a “Go Shop”

Posted In Fiduciary Duty, M&A

FrontFour Capital Grp. LLC v. Taube, C.A. No. 2019-0100-KSJM (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2019)

This decision involves an increasingly rare occurrence in Delaware: an expedited pre-closing fiduciary duty challenge to a proposed merger.  Specifically, stockholders challenged a proposed combination of a publicly traded asset management firm (Medley Management) with two corporations that it advises pursuant to management agreements: Medley Capital Corporation and Sierra Income Corporation.  The proposed transaction involved Sierra acquiring Medley Management, which is majority owned by the Taube brothers, and Medley Capital, of which the Taube brothers owned less than 15%.  Medley Management stockholders were to receive cash and stock representing a 100% premium to its trading price.  By contrast, Medley Capital stockholders were to receive only shares of Sierra stock providing no premium against its net asset value.   When a Medley Capital investor brought suit in early February, the parties agreed to an expedited trial four weeks after the filing of the case, prior to a March 11 stockholder vote on the merger.  More ›

Chancery Declines to Dismiss Claim that Acquirer Failed to Use “Commercially Reasonable Efforts” to Reach Earn-out Milestones

Posted In M&A

Himawan v. Cephalon, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-075-SG (Del. Ch. Dec. 28, 2018). 

Parties in M&A transactions commonly include efforts clauses, like the obligation to use best efforts, commercially reasonable efforts, etc., to some end.  Delaware law enforces such covenants and views them as creating affirmative duties.  Exactly what duties an efforts clause creates is contextual, however, and courts sometimes wrestle with how to apply them.  Parties on occasion try to bring clarity to their contract by defining what they intend their particular efforts clause to mean, like the parties attempted in this case. More ›

Court Of Chancery Explains Limits Of Incorporation By Reference In Disclosure Law

Posted In M&A

Zalmanoff v. Hardy, C.A. 12912-VCS (November 13, 2018)

This decision holds that it is acceptable to make the needed disclosures to stockholders by sending them both a Form 10-K and proxy statement at the same time. However, this does not mean that it is possible to rely on past SEC filings when a proxy statement omits material information that was disclosed previously. The key is that the various documents need to be disclosed together.

Court Of Chancery Clarifies Set Off Rights Under Acquisition Agreement

Posted In M&A

Post Holdings Inc. v. NPE Seller Rep LLC, C.A. 2017-0772-AGB (October 29, 2018)

Acquisition agreements frequently contain escrows to cover any claims for breach of the warranties in the agreements or other post-closing claims. But that does not mean that a buyer may set off an unliquidated claim against its post-deal payment obligations under the agreement. As this decision holds, to have that set off ability, the agreement must permit it as a matter of right.

Court Of Chancery Provides Definitive Explanation Of A Material Adverse Effect Clause

Posted In M&A

Akorn Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL (October 1, 2018)

Merger agreements often permit the buyer to terminate items when a material adverse effect occurs. This 247 page opinion provides what may be the definitive analysis of such terms as “material adverse effect,” “reasonable best efforts” and “all actions necessary” that are often found in merger agreements. It is also a great source of the key reference materials that the Court of Chancery is increasingly turning to in interpreting what such terms mean in the real world. For example, it teaches that a MAE clause is focused on the target company’s own performance as different from the industry that it belongs to and explains the degree and length of a downturn needed to find an MAE. More ›

Court Of Chancery Again Holds Deal Price Establishes Fair Value

Posted In M&A

In Re PLX Technology Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. 9880-VCL (October 16, 2018)

This massive decision is a primer on Delaware director fiduciary duty. It covers just about all the important issues, with an enormous amount of citations and explanation. It is particularly helpful in showing how directors must meet their disclosure obligations, both to their other directors and to stockholders. It is, of course, very much a product of its unique facts. More ›

Delaware Supreme Court Explains the Ab Initio Requirement of MFW

Posted In M&A

Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., C.A. No. 101, 2018 (Del. Oct. 9, 2018)

 Under Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014), commonly referred to as MFW, a controller may gain the benefit of business judgment review when it conditions a transaction—from the outset (i.e., ab initio)—on two procedural protections.  Those involve approval by (i) an independent special committee and (ii) a majority of the minority stockholders.  The point of the timing requirement is that the controller disables its influence from the beginning, instead of using the option as a bargaining chip when negotiating economic terms. More ›