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Chancery Upholds Challenge to TripAdvisor’s Conversion from a Delaware Corporation into a Nevada Entity


Palkon v. Maffei, C.A. 2023-0449-JTL (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 2024)
This decision arose out of TripAdivor’s conversion from a Delaware corporation into a Nevada corporation. The company’s CEO and Chair had voting control and approved the conversion. The board did not condition the transaction on special committee approval or a majority of the minority stockholder vote. The plaintiff challenged the conversion on the grounds that the CEO and the board approved it to secure litigation protections for themselves under Nevada law more favorable than under Delaware law. More ›

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Chancery Invokes the Implied Covenant to Invalidate Shareholder Rights Plan


Whitestone REIT Operating Partnership L.P. v. Pillarstone Capital REIT, C.A. No. 2022-0607-LWW (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2024)
In Delaware, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in all contracts and ensures that the “fruits of the bargain” are not frustrated by arbitrary or unreasonable action. More ›

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Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Forfeiture for Competition Provision in Partnership Agreement


Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., v. Ainslie, No. 162, 2023 (Del. Jan. 29, 2024)
Here, a limited partnership agreement authorized the partnership to withhold distributions owed to a partner who withdraws from the partnership and engages in specified competitive activities. The partnership attempted to enforce the agreement and several former partners sued in Delaware. At the trial court level, the Court of Chancery scrutinized the provision using the standard for non-compete covenants and found the provision overbroad and unreasonable and thus invalid on policy grounds. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that forfeiture for competition provisions in partnership agreements should not be reviewed for reasonableness. Rather, they should “enjoy … deference on equal footing with any other bargained-for-term in a limited partnership agreement.” The Supreme Court’s reasoning largely turned on the express policy of the Delaware limited partnership statute (DRULPA) to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of partnership agreements.

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Chancery Excuses Condition in Stockholder Agreement When Company Caused its Non-Occurrence


Chordia v. Lee, C.A. No. 2023-0382-NAC (Del. Ch. Jan. 4, 2024)
In this case, as part of a sale of a majority interest, a stockholder agreement granted the founders the ability to designate members to the board of directors so long as at least one founder remained at the company as an officer or employee. The agreement also granted the board the ability to hire and fire executive employees, but did not allow the board to terminate non-executive employees. In addition, the stockholder’s agreement required that the company use reasonable efforts to ensure the rights in the agreement remained effective for the founders’ benefit. More ›

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Chancery Invalidates Elon Musk’s $55.8 Billion Pay Package


Tornetta v. Musk, et al., C.A. 2018-0408-KSJM (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2024)
Stockholders of Tesla, Inc. brought a derivative action against Elon Musk and six individual Tesla directors, alleging that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by awarding Musk performance-based stock options in January 2018 with a potential $55.8 billion maximum value and $2.6 billion grant date fair value. Following a trial, the Court of Chancery held that the defendants failed to meet their burden to prove the fairness of the compensation plan and granted the plaintiffs’ request to rescind the plan in its entirety. More ›

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Chancery Addresses Pleading-Stage Arguments for Dismissal in LLC Dispute


Principal Growth Strategies LLC v. AGH Parent LLC, C.A. 2019-0431-JTL (Del. Ch. January 25, 2024)
This decision provides helpful guidance to practitioners to address pleading-stage arguments for dismissal. The plaintiff asserted fiduciary claims against the controller and manager of a Delaware LLC, who allegedly engineered an asset-swap transaction at the expense of the LLC. The Court of Chancery largely denied the motions to dismiss. More ›

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Chancery Confirms Bad Faith Pleading Standard for Officer Caremark Claims


Segway Inc. v. Hong Cai, C.A. No. 2022-1110-LWW (Del. Ch. Ct. Dec. 14, 2023)
The Caremark doctrine recognizes the duty of oversight for directors of Delaware corporations. Under In re McDonald's Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litigation, 289 A.3d 343 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2023), corporate officers, and not just directors, owe a duty of oversight, at least within the scope of each officer’s responsibilities. This decision confirms that the same pleading standard – one requiring bad faith – applies to officer oversight claims. Here, the plaintiff brought such a claim against its former president arising out of declining sales of the company's transportation devices and an increase in accounts receivable. More ›

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Chancery Finds Amendment to LLC Agreement Invalid for Want of Manager’s Involvement

Posted In Chancery, LLCs


DiDonato v. Campus Eye Management, LLC, C.A. No. 2023-0671-LWW (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2024)
In governance disputes among LLC constituencies, the operating agreement is the beginning and often end point. This action involved a challenged amendment to an LLC agreement, which provided in relevant part: “[t]he Agreement may be amended, modified, waived or supplemented by the Manager with the written consent of all Members.” The Court found this language was unambiguous and expressly required the manager to be involved in any amendment. In doing so, the Court declined to read the provision – which was the only one in the contract addressing amendments – as permissive and allowing other forms of amendment. Considering the provision, the Court also declined to invoke Section 18-302(f) of the LLC Act, which allows amendments with approval of all members, finding that section applies only where the LLC agreement lacks a mechanism for amendments.

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Chancery Clarifies Controlling Stockholder Fiduciary Duties in Sears Litigation


In re Sears Hometown and Outlet Stores, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 2019-0798-JTL (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2024)
Here, a special committee of the board supported a plan to liquidate the company’s floundering business segment and continue operating its more promising business segment. The company’s controlling stockholder opposed the plan and took action to prevent its implementation. He first adopted a bylaw that created hurdles to the plan’s approval. He then replaced two of the three directors serving on the special committee who most favored the plan. He ultimately agreed to acquire the minority stockholders’ interests in a squeeze-out transaction negotiated with the remaining special committee member.  More ›

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Chancery Dismisses Caremark Oversight Claims


In Re ProAssurance Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 2022-0034-LWW (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2023)
Claims against corporate fiduciaries for breaches of the duty of oversight are colloquially referred to as “Caremark” claims. This decision exemplifies why Caremark claims are among the most difficult to prosecute and “should be reserved for extreme events.” More ›

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Chancery Decides Scope of Expert’s Authority in Valuation Dispute Resolution Mechanism


Paul v. Rockpoint Group LLC, C.A. 2018-0907-JTL (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2024)
This dispute arose from a disagreement over the authority of an appraiser to include legal assertions and extrinsic evidence in his valuation. The underlying dispute stemmed from the departure of a co-founder from a limited liability company. The parties' LLC Agreement established a dispute resolution mechanism to determine the value of the co-founder's share if a subsequent qualifying transaction occurred. More ›

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Chancery Orders LLC’s Dissolution as Sanction


Kaufman v. DNARx LLC, C.A. No. 2022-0968-KSJM; C.A. No. 2022-0982-KSJM (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2023) (ORDER)
The Court of Chancery has broad power to address litigation misconduct. This sanctions order arose out of litigation concerning a loan to a start-up Delaware LLC in the medical research field. The litigation misconduct by the defendant LLC included lying, destroying evidence, and ignoring numerous court orders. Finding the defendant’s actions egregious and deplorable, the Court entered an extreme sanction—dissolution of the LLC and a liquidation process overseen by a court-appointed receiver.

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Chancery Strikes Unclean Hands Defense Lacking Sufficient Nexus to the Claims


Pilot Corp. v. Abel, C.A. No. 2023-0813-MTZ (Del. Ch. Dec. 13, 2023)
Here, the plaintiff claimed that the adoption of pushdown accounting constituted a change to accounting rights that triggered a right to consent under the relevant operating agreement. The defendants asserted that the plaintiff had unclean hands because the plaintiff had manipulated earnings to alter valuation of a put right. The Court found the unclean hands defense inapplicable because the plaintiff’s claims were narrow and did not have an immediate direct relation the defense.

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Chancery Declines to Shift Costs to Derivative Plaintiffs


In re Oracle Corp. Deriv. Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0337-SG (Del. Ch. Dec. 28, 2023)
By rule, the prevailing party in Court of Chancery litigation is entitled to shift costs to the losing party, subject to the Court’s discretion. Here, in an unordinary derivative action, the Court declined to shift the costs of the prevailing individual defendants to the derivative plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had overcome a motion to dismiss, which led to the appointment of a special litigation committee by the company’s board. While the special committee had the power to seek dismissal, the committee determined that the derivative plaintiffs should be allowed to prosecute the claims on the company’s behalf. The plaintiffs ultimately lost after trial. As a result, the individual defendants were entitled to indemnification by the company, including for costs. The Court cited these circumstances as grounds for invoking equity to decline shifting costs via rule to the derivative plaintiffs.

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Plaintiffs Adequately Pled Unjust Enrichment for Materially Deficient Disclosures


Buttonwood Tree Value Partners, L.P. v. R.L. Polk & Co. Inc., C.A. No. 9250-VCG (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2023)
To state a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must adequately plead: (1) an enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) a relation between the enrichment and impoverishment; and (4) the absence of a justification. In this Court of Chancery action, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were unjustly enriched because the plaintiffs were induced to tender their shares for inadequate compensation as a result of materially misleading disclosures. In response, the defendants argued that the relationship between the company’s self-tender and the benefits that the defendants received from subsequent special dividends and the sale of the company were too attenuated to plead that defendants were aware of these future developments. The Court held, however, that the plaintiffs had adequately pled their claims for unjust enrichment because defendants allegedly knew the true sale value of the company and defendants caused the company to make materially deficient disclosures to increase the defendants’ equity.

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