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Summaries and analysis of recent Delaware court decisions concerning business-related litigation.
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Showing 7 posts in Directors and Officers.
Chancery Confirms Bad Faith Pleading Standard for Officer Caremark Claims
Segway Inc. v. Hong Cai, C.A. No. 2022-1110-LWW (Del. Ch. Ct. Dec. 14, 2023)
The Caremark doctrine recognizes the duty of oversight for directors of Delaware corporations. Under In re McDonald's Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litigation, 289 A.3d 343 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2023), corporate officers, and not just directors, owe a duty of oversight, at least within the scope of each officer’s responsibilities. This decision confirms that the same pleading standard – one requiring bad faith – applies to officer oversight claims. Here, the plaintiff brought such a claim against its former president arising out of declining sales of the company's transportation devices and an increase in accounts receivable. More ›
Chancery Upholds Claims Against LLC Officers and Others Arising from Squeeze-Out of Minority Unitholders
Cygnus Opportunity Fund, LLC v. Washington Prime Group, LLC, C.A. No. 2022-0718-JTL (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2023)
An Indiana corporation reorganized via bankruptcy into a Delaware LLC, and a senior note holder negotiated for nearly 90 percent of the equity. The LLC agreement required that at least one member of the five-member board of managers be independent. It prohibited the controller from acquiring additional shares or squeezing out the minority without approval of the majority of independent managers or a majority of votes cast by minority unitholders. It also required the controller to provide notice of a proposed squeeze-out so that minority unitholders would have the option to challenge the fairness of the transaction unless it had received approval from a majority of the minority or a minority-approved independent manager. More ›
Chancery Determines That Former Executives Are Not Entitled to Equity Awards Under Separation Agreement
SeaWorld Entm't, Inc. v. Andrews, C.A. No. 2020-0955-NAC (Del. Ch. May 19, 2023)
SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc. granted unvested equity awards to employees. Pursuant to equity agreements, the awards would vest if the company's controller sold its stock above a threshold price and if the company still employed the awardees at the time of sale. Under the terms of the underlying incentive compensation plan, the company had sole discretion to amend any term of the equity agreements, including to treat individuals differently. More ›
Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Delaware Choice-of-Law Ruling In Dismissal of D&O Liability Insurance Coverage Dispute
Stillwater Mining Company v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA et al., No. 24, 2022 (Del. Jan. 12, 2023)
This decision from Delaware Supreme Court addresses choice-of-law questions for D&O insurance contract disputes and cautions litigants to remain consistent in the positions they take before the trial court. The appellant here, an insured under a tower of directors and officers’ liability insurance policies, asserted that Delaware law applied to the claims in its original complaint for coverage of its defense costs in an appraisal action. Following a decision from the Delaware Supreme Court in another matter (In re Solera Ins. Coverage Appeals), which held that an insurer is not obligated to provide coverage for appraisal actions under a similar insurance policy, the insured amended its complaint and, in so doing, argued that Montana rather than Delaware law controlled. More ›
Chancery Finds Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Over Delaware Corporate Officers Based on Due Process Considerations
In re Bam International, LLC v. The MSBA Group Inc., C.A. No. 2021-0181-SG (Del. Ch. Dec. 14, 2021)
Two officers of a Delaware corporation were sued for alleged tortious interference with an escrow agreement between the Delaware corporation employing the officers and the plaintiff (another Delaware corporation). The plaintiff also brought a breach of contract claims against the Delaware corporation and other entity defendants. The two officers moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction arguing that, other than their status as officers of a Delaware corporation, they had no relationship with Delaware. The officers further noted that they were not signatories to the contract at issue, which, in any event, was only connected to Delaware by choice of law and forum clauses. Plaintiff contended that the officer defendants, as fiduciaries of a Delaware entity, had implicitly consented to jurisdiction pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 3114(b). More ›
Chancery Addresses Authority of Executives to Remove Managers of Affiliate Entities
Roccia v. Mugica, C.A. No. 2020-0641-MTZ (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2020)
The inherent authority of officers of Delaware companies generally extends to powers in the usual and ordinary course of the relevant company’s business. Officers otherwise gain authority through either express grants from the company’s governing body or implied grants based on past practice. In the LLC context, sources of an officer’s actual authority may include the LLC’s operating agreement and any employment agreement. In this decision, the Court of Chancery held that the plain language of a Delaware LLC’s operating agreement and the relevant employment agreement did not grant the President and CEO of a parent-entity the authority to act on the parent’s behalf to remove a member of the board of managers of a sub-entity. More ›
Chancery Holds That Management Does Not Have Unilateral Authority to Preclude a Director From Obtaining the Company’s Privileged Information
In Re WeWork Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 2020-0258-AGB (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2020)
In October 2019, The We Company’s (the “Company”) board of directors established a special committee (the “Special Committee”) to evaluate a potential transaction wherein SoftBank, the controlling shareholder, would acquire majority economic ownership and voting control of the Company. When SoftBank terminated the transaction, the Special Committee filed this action on behalf of the Company alleging that they had breached their contractual obligations to use reasonable best efforts to purchase $3 billion of the Company’s stock in a tender offer. More ›
