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Summaries and analysis of recent Delaware court decisions concerning business-related litigation.

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Showing 5 posts in Chancery.

Chancery Explains the Rule “Equity will not Enjoin a Libel” – and its Limited Exception

Preston Hollow Capital LLC v. Nuveen LLC, C.A. No. 2019-0169-SG (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2019).

The Court of Chancery in several recent decisions has addressed the limited circumstances in which it may have jurisdiction to enjoin future speech.  See, e.g., Perlman v. Vox Media, Inc., 2019 WL 2647520 (Del. Ch. Jun. 27, 2019); Organovo Hldgs., Inc. v. Dimitrov, 162 A. 3d 102 (Del. Ch. 2017).  Here, Vice Chancellor Glasscock explains the maxim “[e]quity will not enjoin a libel” and the limited potential exceptions.  In particular, and subject to constitutional free speech limitations, Chancery may enjoin future speech in the nature of “trade libel” as a remedy for a separate “non-speech” business tort over which it has jurisdiction. More ›

Chancery Denies Director Access to Privileged Materials Involving Counsel to Preferred-Appointed Directors

Gilmore v. Turvo, Inc., C.A. No. 2019-0472-JRS (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2019).

As several Delaware decisions teach, each director, as a member of the larger deliberative body that is the board, has a fundamental right to access corporate information to carry out his or her fiduciary duties.  Thus, as a general rule, a Delaware corporation “cannot assert the privilege to deny a director access to legal advice furnished to the board during the director’s tenure.”  There are several exceptions to this rule.  More ›

Formulaic Recitations of Equitable Jurisdiction Are Not Enough for Court of Chancery Jurisdiction

Athene Life and Annuity Co. v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., C.A. No. 2018-0244-SG (Del. Ch. July 31, 2019).

The Court of Chancery is a court of limited jurisdiction. It maintains subject matter jurisdiction only for (i) equitable claims, (ii) when equitable relief is sought and no adequate remedy is available at law, or (iii) where a statute confers jurisdiction.  Applying well-recognized equitable jurisdiction principles, the Court dismissed this breach of contract action.  Although Plaintiffs sought equitable relief in the form of specific performance and an injunction, their request for equitable relief was merely a “formulaic incantation” rather than substantive.  Applying a realistic assessment of the nature of the wrong alleged and the remedy available at law, the Court concluded that a legal remedy for the breach of contract claim was available in the form of a declaratory judgment and damages, and fully adequate. Normally when a court issues a declaratory judgment establishing the parties’ respective contract rights, the court will not presume that the defendant will fail to abide by the court’s ruling in the future requiring an injunction to secure performance. A real threat of continuing injury must be shown, which was absent here. More ›

Court of Chancery Holds it Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Defamation Claims

Posted In Chancery, Jurisdiction

Stephen G. Perlman, Rearden LLC, and Artemis Networks, LLC v. Vox Media, Inc., C. A. No. 10046-VCS (Del. Ch. June 27, 2019).

Unlike most U.S. states and the federal legal system, Delaware retains the historic distinction between courts of law and courts of equity.   In the absence of a statute granting it jurisdiction over specific claims, the Delaware Court of Chancery has subject matter jurisdiction only where a complaint (i) states an equitable claim, or (ii) seeks an equitable remedy in circumstances where there is no adequate remedy at law.  Here, the Court of Chancery held that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate defamation claims. Specifically, entrepreneur and inventor Stephen G. Perlman and his companies asserted claims of defamation against Vox Media, Inc., and requested relief that included a mandatory injunction requiring the removal of the offending articles from Vox’s websites, a public retraction, and compensatory damages.  In response to Vox’s motion for summary judgment, the Court followed its recent decision in Organovo Hlds., Inc. v. Dimitrov, 162 A.3d 102 (Del. Ch. 2017) (Laster, V.C.) and concluded that “in connection with a claim for defamation, the Court of Chancery, in all instances, lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the questions of whether a defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff and whether it did so with actual malice.” (emphasis added). Organovo explained that these factual questions have historically been reserved for juries rather than judges, and these determinations are best suited for adjudication by a court of law.  Plaintiffs’ effort to couple their defamation claims with requests for equitable relief in the form of an injunction directed at past defamatory statements did not confer equitable jurisdiction, because declaratory relief and money damages generally are adequate remedies at law for defamation claims. The Court explained that equity will intervene to provide injunctive relief only in situations where the defamation claim has been adjudicated in a court of law and legal relief has failed to preclude ongoing publication or is otherwise inadequate.  Accordingly, because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, but gave the plaintiffs the option to transfer the case to Delaware’s Superior Court, a court of law. 

Delaware Supreme Court Highlights Risks Involved in Court Rules Governing Confidential Filings

Posted In Chancery, Confidentiality

DowDuPont Inc. v. The Chemours Co., C.A. No. 2019-0351 (Del. June 26, 2019).

A recent Delaware Supreme Court Order emphasizes the risks associated with the presumptions of public access to court filings and the requirements of Court of Chancery Rule 5.1, which governs the sealing of documents filed with the Court.  Rule 5.1 requires a public version of any document filed under seal, with asserted confidential information redacted, to be filed within a certain number of days. At the trial court level, after ruling that the complaint must be unsealed because the parties’ initial completely-redacted public version failed to comply with Rule 5.1, the Vice Chancellor invited the parties to file a motion for reargument with a revised redacted version of the complaint for his consideration. Instead of moving for reargument, defendants filed an application for certification of an interlocutory appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court on the ground that the complaint was subject to confidential arbitration.  In accord with the Court of Chancery, the Delaware Supreme Court denied the interlocutory appeal request, ruling that the issue did not meet the standards for certification because the sole issue on appeal was the parties’ compliance with Rule 5.1, and not whether the complaint was subject to confidential arbitration.  The Supreme Court noted that the parties potentially could have avoided the claimed irreparable harm caused by unsealing the complaint if they had moved for reargument with a revised redacted version of the complaint that complied with Rule 5.1.