About This Blog
Summaries and analysis of recent Delaware court decisions concerning business-related litigation.
Morris James Blogs
Showing 20 posts by Albert H. Manwaring, IV.
Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law permits a stockholder to inspect the books and records of a corporation, provided that the demand for inspection meets certain form and manner requirements, and the inspection is sought for a proper purpose—e.g., one reasonably related to the interests of stockholders. Plaintiff stockholders bear the burden of proving that each category of documents sought is essential to accomplish the stockholders’ purpose for the inspection. Section 220 inspections of books and records are not intended to produce a comprehensive set of documents that would likely be produced under discovery rules in a plenary action. Rather, the goal in a 220 action is to provide stockholders with a discrete set of documents sufficient or necessary to accomplish their purpose. More ›
This top ten list summarizes significant decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery over the past calendar year 2018. The article was originally published in Transaction Advisors.
The cases selected either meaningfully changed Delaware law or provided clarity or guidance on issues relevant to corporate and commercial litigation in Delaware.
One: City of North Miami Beach General Employees’ Retirement Plan v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Group Inc., 189 A.3d 188 (Del. Ch. June 1, 2018) (Bouchard, Chancellor)
This decision arose out of a merger involving the Dr. Pepper and Keurig companies. In a reverse triangular merger, a parent company uses a subsidiary to acquire a target, with the target absorbing that subsidiary. That is how Dr. Pepper and Keurig structured their deal. The result was Dr. Pepper stockholders getting cash but retaining their stock, and Keurig’s stockholders getting a controlling interest in Dr. Pepper. Certain Dr. Pepper stockholders sued in the Court of Chancery, asserting that they had appraisal rights to a judicially-determined fair value in connection with the deal under Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), which were being violated. More ›
The State of Delaware’s policy is to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract. Delaware courts seek to enforce the language in an agreement negotiated by the parties and will not rewrite the agreement after the fact to reallocate risks, especially in an agreement between sophisticated parties that was bargained for at arm’s length. This includes risks allocated through “material adverse effect” (MAE) provisions in a merger or acquisition agreement. The Delaware Court of Chancery’s recent decision in Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (Laster, V.C.), illustrates how the court applies Delaware’s policy of freedom of contract. While this is the first time that the court has found that an MAE on the seller’s business justified a buyer’s termination of a merger agreement, this decision presented an exceptional set of facts regarding the utter deterioration of Akorn’s business and widespread company regulatory compliance issues affecting its pipeline of new generic drugs. Accordingly, the court’s ruling merely represents the application of a well-known principle to enforce the language of a merger agreement, allocating the risks bargained for by sophisticated parties, to an egregious set of facts. More ›
Chancery Rejects Merger Price as Indicator of Fair Value in Appraisal Based on Flaws in Sales Process
Appraisal is a limited statutory remedy that provides a Delaware general corporation’s stockholders, who dissent to the sufficiency of the merger price, with the right to have the Delaware Court of Chancery determine the “fair value” of their shares, 8 Del. C. Section 262. In determining fair value, the court must consider all relevant factors. While a single or multiple factors may be considered in the valuation, the court’s determination of the relevant factors must be grounded in the evidentiary record and “accepted financial principles.” More ›
Self-Dealing Conduct Supporting Fiduciary-Duty Claims Was Covered by Contractual Duties Imposed in the LLC Agreement
The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act’s policy is to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract in LLC operating agreements. The act permits parties to eliminate common-law fiduciary duties, and replace them with contractual duties that are often more limited in scope than default common-law fiduciary duties. While parties may not eliminate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an operating agreement, the implied covenant only operates to imply terms essential to fill gaps necessary to meet the reasonable expectations of the parties as reflected in the express terms of the operating agreement. More ›
The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act’s policy is to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract in LLC operating agreements. While the act permits parties to eliminate fiduciary duties that members or managers would otherwise owe to one another, an operating agreement may not eliminate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that inheres in every LLC operating agreement under Delaware law. The implied covenant operates to imply terms to address developments or contractual gaps that neither party anticipated in the operating agreement, but which are necessary to fill gaps essential to meeting the reasonable expectations of the parties as reflected in the express terms of the operating agreement. More ›
Morris James attorneys Lewis Lazarus, Albert Manwaring and Albert Carroll authored an article published in Transaction Advisors titled Delaware Corporate and Commercial Case Law Year in Review – 2017. The article summarizes ten significant decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery over the past year, including matters such as appraisal rights, duties in the master limited partnership context, director compensation awards, and preclusion in shareholder derivative litigation. Continue reading for the full article. More ›
Wilmington Trust serves as the sole trustee for certain du Pont Family Trusts established in the 1940s and 1950s. For many years, Wilmington Trust was closely associated with the du Pont family, and was managed in part by family members. Following the near collapse of its business in the 2008 financial crisis, Wilmington Trust was acquired by M&T Bank. Today, Wilmington Trust is a wholly-owned subsidiary of M&T Bank, and no member of the du Pont family serves on Wilmington Trust’s board. In 2013, at the prompting of the current trusts’ beneficiary, Douglas du Pont, Wilmington Trust agreed to modify the trusts to authorize Mr. du Pont to serve as the “Investment Direction Advisor” for the trusts’ assets, which limited Wilmington Trust to a principally ministerial role in the trusts’ on-going administration. In October 2016, alleged tensions between Mr. du Pont and Wilmington Trust led Mr. du Pont to petition the Court of Chancery to seek to remove Wilmington Trust as the trustee altogether, and to appoint a successor trustee. More ›
The predominant approach in most jurisdictions to determine whether the dismissal of a derivative action based on the failure to adequately plead demand futility bars re-litigation of this issue in a subsequent derivative action brought by a different stockholder plaintiff is to apply the traditional legal test for issue preclusion. Generally in these jurisdictions, issue preclusion bars re-litigation of demand futility if: the demand-futility issue is the same; the issue is actually litigated and necessary to a final judgment; it involves the same parties in the prior derivative action or in privity with those parties; and there is adequate representation of counsel in the prior derivative action. More ›
Under the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), business judgment review applies to cleanse a fiduciary challenge to a noncontrol transaction that was approved by an uncoerced, fully-informed, disinterested stockholder vote. Absent a claim of waste, the result of a Corwin-qualifying stockholder vote is dismissal. The Corwin doctrine is premised on the rationale that when a disinterested majority of stockholders approve a transaction, the vote represents their determination that the transaction is in the corporate interest, and Delaware courts will avoid second-guessing the stockholders' decision by applying the deferential business judgment rule. More ›
Investment bankers play a central role in the exploration, evaluation, selection and implementation of strategic alternatives for Delaware companies. To enable stockholders to carefully assess how much weight to give an investment banker's analysis of a proposed strategic transaction, Delaware law requires full disclosure of a banker's compensation or financial interest, and other potential banker conflicts of interest in connection with the transaction. If the banker's financial interest in the proposed transaction is "material" and "quantifiable," full disclosure of the financial interest to stockholders is required under Delaware law. To obtain meaningful relief for the benefit of stockholders, the Delaware Court of Chancery has indicated its strong preference for plaintiffs to assert claims to correct disclosures to stockholders in advance of the stockholder vote on the proposed transaction. More ›
Buyers unhappy with the performance of a company or assets purchased frequently assert claims that the seller fraudulently induced the purchase by providing false information of the value of the company or assets in the sale process.
The Delaware Court of Chancery has often addressed whether the language in a disclaimer of extra-contractual representations in a purchase agreement is sufficient to shield a seller from liability for fraud. In these decisions, the court has provided guidance for the language in disclaimers or anti-reliance clauses necessary to avoid claims of fraud based on extra-contractual representations.
To start in Abry Partners V. v. F&W Acquisition, 891 A.2d 1032, 1059 (Del. Ch. 2006), the court ruled that a standard integration clause, barring contract claims based on prior written agreements, and prior or contemporaneous oral agreements, but without explicit anti-reliance language disclaiming reliance on extra-contractual representations, will not shield the seller from liability for fraud.
Further, in FdG Logistics v. A&R Holdings, 131 A.3d 842, 860 (Del. Ch. 2016), the court ruled that a disclaimer must come from the aggrieved party, meaning the buyer who asserts the fraud. Thus, a seller's disclaimer of what it did or did not represent is insufficient by itself to bar a fraud claim based on extra-contractual representations. Lastly, in Praire Capital v. Double E Holding, 132 A.3d 35, 51 (Del. Ch. 2015), the court ruled that to disclaim reliance does not require any "magic words," or even that a disclaimer or anti-reliance clause be styled negatively to deny reliance on extra-contractual representations. More ›
In a stockholder challenge to a going-private merger by a controlling stockholder to buy out minority stockholders, the operative standard of review is ordinarily the most rigorous judicial review, entire fairness. To obtain the most deferential judicial review, business judgment, in a challenge to a squeeze-out merger, the controlling stockholder may, however, structure the merger to satisfy the MFW framework approved by the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). The MFW framework requires that the controlling stockholder condition the merger on both approval of an independent, adequately empowered special committee of the board that fulfills its duty of care in negotiating a fair merger price, and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority disinterested, independent stockholders. If the MFW requirements are satisfied, the business judgment rule applies, and the Delaware Court of Chancery will dismiss the stockholder challenge to the squeeze-out merger unless the merger somehow constitutes waste—which is logically impossible to prove after the fully informed, uncoerced, independent stockholders ratify the merger by their vote. More ›
In an appraisal proceeding under Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, the Delaware Court of Chancery determines the "fair value" of a company's "shares exclusive of any element arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger." In determining fair value of a company's shares, the court values the company as a "going concern" based on the "operative reality" existing as of the date of the merger. The court has "significant discretion to use the valuation methods it deems appropriate, including the parties' proposed valuation frameworks, or one of the court's own making." Both the petitioner and the respondent share the burden of proof in an appraisal proceeding to establish fair value of a company's shares by a preponderance of the evidence. More ›
The Delaware Supreme Court held in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings, that "when a transaction not subject to the entire fairness standard is approved by a fully-informed, uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders, the business judgment rule applies," even when a stockholder vote is statutorily required and the transaction is otherwise subject to the Revlon, 125 A.3d 304, 308-09 (Del. 2015),standard of review. More ›