Posts in Corwin Doctrine

Chancery Holds Unocal Claims for Injunctive Relief are not Subject to Corwin Cleansing

In re Edgio, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2022-0624-MTZ (Del. Ch. May 1, 2023)
Under Corwin, a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders can shift the standard of judicial review for certain transactions from heightened scrutiny to the business judgment rule. But there are some transactions that Corwin cannot cleanse. Here, at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court declined to apply the Corwin doctrine to a Unocal claim seeking to enjoin certain alleged defensive measures taken by the company's board.  More ›

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Chancery Finds SPAC’s Sponsor and Board Potentially Violated Fiduciary Duties by Depriving Public Stockholders of the Information Material to the Stock Redemption Decision

Delman v. GigAcquisitions3 LLC, C.A. No. 2021-0679-LWW (Del. Ch. January 4, 2023)
Delaware law establishes that fiduciaries of a corporation cannot be exempted from "their loyalty obligation and the attendant equitable standards of review that [the] court will apply to enforce it." In this case, following last year's Multiplan decision (discussed here), stockholders alleged that a SPAC's sponsor and board members breached their fiduciary duties by failing to disclose information material to the stockholders' decision on whether to redeem the stock prior to the de-SPAC transaction. This decision denies the defendants' motion to dismiss and finds that stockholders properly brought the lawsuit as a class action based on the fact that the alleged harm they suffered was individually compensable. More ›

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On Motion To Dismiss, Court of Chancery Holds That Alleged Disclosure Violations Were Insufficient To Rebut Corwin Protections Of A Fully Informed Stockholder Vote

Teamster Members Ret. Plan v. Randall S. Dearth et al., C.A. No. 2020-0807-MTZ (Del. Ch. May 31, 2022)
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Corwin and its progeny, a transaction approved by a fully informed, uncoerced stockholder vote, not involving a controlling stockholder, receives business judgment rule protection. However, one sufficiently alleged disclosure deficiency is enough to put into question whether a stockholder vote is fully informed and, thus, to defeat a motion to dismiss. More ›

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Court of Chancery Dismisses Thinly-Pleaded Breach of LPA Claim and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Disclaimed by LPA and Foreclosed by Corwin

Ryan v. Buckeye Partners L.P. et al., C.A. No. 2021-0432-JRS (Del. Ch. Feb. 9, 2021)
Delaware is a notice pleading jurisdiction. But, even under this forgiving standard, the Court of Chancery Rule 8 still requires that the pleadings give defendants notice of the claims asserted against them. This recent decision from the Court of Chancery found that Plaintiff’s breach of a limited partnership agreement (“LPA”) claim failed to put Defendants on notice of even what provisions were allegedly breached. The Court also held that Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claims was deficient because the LPA disclaimed traditional fiduciary duties and, in all events, the claims were foreclosed by a fully informed vote under Corwin. More ›

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Chancery Dismisses All Claims in Stockholder Challenge to Cash-Out Merger Transaction

Harcum v. Lovoi, C.A. No. 2020-0398-PAF (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2022)
In Harcum, the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed all claims brought in a stockholder suit alleging fiduciary breaches in connection with the $1 billion dollar acquisition of Roan Resources Inc. by Citizen Energy Operating, LLC. The Court found that the transaction was “cleansed” pursuant to Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312 (Del. 2015), because the plaintiff failed to adequately plead that any alleged controllers were conflicted or that the transaction was not approved by an uncoerced, fully informed stockholder vote.  More ›

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Chancery Rejects Argument that Omitted Information Prevents Corwin Dismissal

Galindo v. Stover, C.A. No. 2021-0031-SG (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2022)
If a majority of fully informed, uncoerced, disinterested stockholders vote to approve a merger not involving a conflicted controlling stockholder, then under the Corwin doctrine, the business judgment rule applies because the vote cleanses any breach of duty (except a claim for waste). In this decision, the Court of Chancery returns to what it means for the stockholder vote to be “informed.” More ›

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Chancery Rejects Inadequate Disclosure Contentions and Grants Corwin Dismissal

Kihm v. Mott, C.A. No. 2020-0938-MTZ (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2021)
Under the Corwin doctrine, a fully informed and uncoerced approval of a board decision by the corporation’s disinterested stockholders can downgrade an otherwise heightened standard of review to deferential business judgment review and result in prompt dismissal of post-closing M&A litigation not involving a conflicted controlling stockholder. Kihm involved a merger breach of fiduciary duty challenge and an attempt to avoid Corwin cleansing based on alleged deficient disclosures in the target board’s recommendation statement to the stockholders. More ›

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Chancery Applies Corwin Doctrine to Medium-Form Merger Absent Controller Conflict 

English v. Narang, C.A. No. 2018-0221-AGB (Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 2019).

Under the well-known Corwin doctrine, when a transaction not subject to the entire fairness standard of review is approved by a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders, the business judgment rule applies. Corwin's cleansing effect applies not just to affirmative votes in favor of long-form mergers, but also to acceptance of tender offers for medium-form mergers, like the merger in this case. This Corwin dismissal is notable for its unique facts—the target's substantial blockholder (34%) with voting control (84.5%). But, as this decision explains, the mere existence of a controlling stockholder does not give rise to entire fairness review and take a case outside of Corwin. For that to happen, the transaction must also involve some sort of disabling conflict for the controller. Here, the complaint lacked specific factual allegations to sustain the plaintiffs' theory that the controller had an emergency liquidity need and thus received a unique benefit from tendering.  In this regard, the Court found insufficient plaintiffs’ conclusory contention that the controller needed to liquidate his position as part of his estate planning and wealth management strategy following his retirement because his holdings made up most of his net worth.  

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